

## MILITARY POLICE SUPPORT FOR THE AIRLAND BATTLE

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### Preface

**The fundamental mission of the military police (MP) is to support commanders on the battlefield.** Should a conflict occur anywhere in the world, MP will be an integral part of it. FM 19-1 is the MP keystone manual. This manual emphasizes what MP leaders must know about MP capabilities to help friendly forces defeat the enemy. Additionally, it informs tactical commanders how MP can contribute toward success in battle.

**FM 19-1 is designed for MP leaders, commanders and their staffs, and US Army service schools.** FM 19-1 provides guidance for use by commanders and trainers at all echelons. It explains how the MP are organized and employed to support the tactical commander on the battlefield. It discusses MP support to all echelons, from the forward deployed brigades to the units at the rear edge of the communications zone (COMMZ).

FM 19-1 is based on the purpose, organization, responsibilities, and goals of the US Army as set forth in FM 100-1 and FM 100-5. The principles of MP support are based on the doctrine and operational principles contained in FM 71-3(HTF), FM 17-95, FM 71-100(HTF), and FM 71-101(HTF). Most terms and graphics needed to understand this manual are contained in FM 101-5-1. *Special terms used in this manual are explained in the glossary.*

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

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CHAPTER 1

**The Challenge to Military Police on the Battlefield**

**Military police on the battlefield support the combat commander's mission to win the battle.** They help the commander achieve his objective of destroying enemy forces, large or small, wherever and whenever the Army is sent to war.


MP provide a wide range of support to contribute to the Army's battlefield success. They combat enemy forces in the rear areas, They expedite the movement of critical combat resources. They evacuate enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). They provide security to critical Army facilities and resources. And they provide commanders and soldiers with police services, as needed.

MP on the battlefield operate as a flexible, economy-of-force organization. Organized in small tactical elements, they perform a wide range of support—keyed to the echelon commander's priorities. MP three-man teams are versatile. Their experienced use of

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initiative, their mobility and firepower, and their communications ability enable them to operate separately as well as in combination. The team is the building block of MP units. Reconnoitering their area of operations (AO) in teams, they operate with economy of force. As squads or platoons defending a base they can generate substantial short-term combat power for the tactical commander.

**MILITARY POLICE THREE-MAN TEAM**



Military police provide the battlefield commander with a small tactical force that is—

- Organized.
- Highly mobile.
- Flexible.
- Operates separately
- Operates in combinations
- Well equipped.
- Quick responding.



## CHANGES AND CHALLENGES ON THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD

On the modern battlefield the US Army may face heavy forces in large-scale battles in fully developed areas of the world. Or it may face light forces in small, limited battles in undeveloped and developing areas. In either place the Army must be ready to fight enemy forces ranging from light, well-equipped, Soviet-supported insurgents to highly mechanized forces typical of Warsaw Pact nations. Wherever the Army is committed to war, it must be able to meet a conflict greater in scope and in intensity than ever before. *Its battles may well be more deadly than those fought on any battlefield in history.*

Previous wars have provided us little experience in fighting in an environment made chaotic by both nuclear and chemical weapons. Today, the number of nations that can employ these weapons is growing. The Army must be able to fight where nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, as well as directed energy weapons and enhanced conventional weapons, have been employed.

In prior wars, the area of actual combat was usually shallow and linear. The modern battlefield will extend in all directions. AirLand Battle doctrine recognizes that there will be three operations: deep operations, close operations, and rear operations. Forces will rarely fight along orderly, distinct lines.

Today, increased air mobility and weapons with longer ranges are coupled with a tactical emphasis on striking deep into an enemy's territory. In an AirLand Battle this will pose an unprecedented likelihood of extensive combat action in what were previously "safe" rear areas. Sophisticated and highly accurate weapons systems can inflict heavy damage on both sides. Forces will direct active reconnaissance and surveillance against both forward and rear areas. Target-acquisition efforts and electronic warfare will be directed against forward and rear areas on both sides.

Massive troop concentrations and/or immensely destructive firepower will make some penetration by both sides nearly inevitable.

The Army also must be prepared to face a numerically superior force. The need for rapid and constant maneuver, relocation, and logistical support will place great demands on MP to ensure that resupply facilities remain secure and operational. Joint operations will be a certainty, and combined operations will be quite likely. Interoperability of equipment and doctrine will play an increasing role in the combat effectiveness of the MP.

In previous wars, military operations were often followed by lulls. During this time both sides could rearm and reconstitute their forces. The next war is likely to be a continuous operation. There may not be hesitations in battle during which forces can be reconstituted and resupplied. Yet doing so will be imperative. Rapid movement and replacement of troops, ammunition, and materiel will be critical to combat success.

Historically, our military has had the luxury of time in which to mobilize manpower. It has had time in which to achieve air and ground superiority. In other wars, between the outbreak of hostilities and the onset of decisive battles, the enemy could be delayed to gain time. That much-needed time was used to move equipment and supplies. It was used to develop industrial support. It was used to acquire and train troops. And it was used to prepare for decisive battles.

But on a modern AirLand battlefield, the Army will face large, heavily mechanized forces intent on quick victory through sustained, unrelenting battle. It will face forces like those of the Warsaw Pact whose doctrine of mass, momentum, and continuous combat intends the first battle to be potentially overwhelming. Against such

forces the Army cannot afford prolonged mobilization.

To survive such an opening onslaught, the Army must fight, outnumbered, with everything it has—and win. The furious battle will be fought by forward deployed

forces and their immediate reinforcements. Every major combat unit will be needed to fight the battle against a numerically superior threat. The Army will have few tactical or operational level reserves—particularly at corps or higher echelons—to hold back from the battle.

## THE MP ROLE IN COMBAT SUCCESS


MP will help tactical commanders meet the challenges of AirLand Battle. MP have always provided the Army a wide range of diverse support. MP are ready to perform this wide range of support with a limited but flexible force. Each MP team is ready to conduct—

- Ž **Combat** operations against the rear area threat.
- Ž **Combat support** (CS) operations expediting the movement of combat resources and evacuating EPWs from the battle area.
- Ž **Combat service support** (CSS) operations providing commanders and soldiers with law and order services.

In previous wars MP have often performed a rear security role. *On the modern*

*battlefield the need for protection against a rear area threat will be vastly increased.* The MP role in the rear may, for short periods of time, become a direct combat role. The MP, based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) and the commander's priorities, have the responsibility to seek out, close with, and, when they can, destroy enemy forces in the rear area.

When MP fight as a combat force they will help keep the enemy from delaying the commander's reinforcing units and disrupting his command and control. They will defeat as much of the rear area threat as possible. Enemy forces too large to be defeated by MP will be quickly identified, reported, and, if possible, delayed and disrupted until the commander can deploy a tactical combat force (TCF) to defeat them.



MP will reconnoiter routes to and within the battle area. They will find alternate road networks to ensure a way is open to move reinforcing troops, fuel, food, and ammunition across the battlefield. MP will expedite the rapid movement of units and essential supplies. They will spot and block off contaminated or damaged areas. They will identify bypasses to restore the commander's tactical mobility. And MP will support major operations like river crossings and passages of lines.

MP will ensure tactical commanders are not impeded by the burden of guarding and caring for enemy prisoners. MP will quickly take EPWs from combat units. They will rapidly remove them from the battle area to meet the obligations of international law.

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When needed, MP may be called on to assist commanders and fellow soldiers by providing a variety of police services. They may be tasked to prevent diversion of military resources. They may be tasked to investigate criminal activity. And they may be tasked to deal with military offenders.

MP on the battlefield, with their ability to move, shoot, and communicate, can significantly multiply a commander's combat power. *See Appendix A for information on personnel and equipment.* They can do this without increasing the commander's total force or diverting resources from more critical operations. MP therefore play an important role in meeting the challenges of the AirLand Battle.

## The Threat on the Battlefield

**To successfully support commanders in future battles, MP must understand the concept of the AirLand Battle.** They must understand the nature of the threat in the rear area. They must understand the doctrine and strategy of our nation's potential adversaries. And they must become familiar with their tactics, organization, and equipment.

In the AirLand Battle, separate combat operations fuse into one continuous operation. Operations in each area impact on operations in other areas. Under Air Land Battle doctrine, the actions in all battle areas are synchronized into one coordinated battle.

Traditionally, the Army has fought the close-in operations. In recent years, at times, it has also fought the deep operations. But rear operations, as now envisioned, remain an experience of the future. Because it has not yet been fought by US forces in a modern, high-intensity environment, the concept of protecting the rear area as part of the AirLand Battle must be understood, trained for, and accepted before it can be adequately fought. It must be recognized that in an AirLand Battle forces can be decisively defeated by the enemy in the rear area even while winning elsewhere.

*Military forces likely to be our adversaries (the Threat) pattern their doctrine, tactics, organizations, and equipment on the model set by the Soviet military. Soviet military tactical doctrine stresses decisive engagement. It stresses massive operations and fast-moving penetrations into their enemy's rear area. The intent is to attack and destroy reserve forces in the rear area. They believe that a resolute offense at fast tempo and to great depth will destroy an enemy force. They believe that victory is most easily and economically achieved by*

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overwhelming their enemy with massive forces. Their losses may be high at the outset. But they believe a quick collapse of the enemy makes these tactics economical.

They consider attacks in rear areas to be an extension of the battle being fought in the main battle area (MBA). They use rear area attacks to destroy critical communication links. They intend to divert forces from the MBA. They also intend to disrupt and degrade the abilities of support forces.

The forces they employ in the rear area include air-dropped, air-landed, mechanized, and amphibious units. They employ special-purpose units trained for reconnaissance and sabotage. They also activate sleeper-agent cells and agent networks.

The Soviet conviction of the value of rear area combat stems from their World War II experiences. The Soviets' extensive use of partisans tied down 24 German divisions. Likewise German diversionary teams were so effective that the Soviets had to assign two regiments of internal security forces to protect the rear area of each Soviet field army.

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The toll exacted by the Soviets' World War II combat operations in their enemy's rear area includes—

- 4,000 tanks disabled,
  - 12,000 highways and railroad bridges destroyed.
  - 20,000 trains wrecked.
  - 1,000,000 enemy killed or wounded.
- 

Because the Soviets strongly believe rear area combat to be effective, they have developed doctrine to support their convictions. The Soviet force structure provides

fully equipped and trained forces for extensive combat in their enemy's rear area.

Thus, *adversaries using the Soviet model can be expected to engage in intense combat activity in their enemy's rear area.* Their forces will penetrate into the enemy's rear to attack and destroy its reserve forces and rear area installations. Their highest priority targets will be nuclear launchers, command and control of nuclear units, command and control elements in general, and CSS elements. They will target command and control centers and communications networks. They also will target sup Ply facilities, airfields, population centers, and nuclear weapons and their storage sites.

Their disruptions may occur deep in the rear area in what appears to be independent operations. Or they may occur immediately behind the MBA, closely coordinated with the actions of their maneuvering forces. They will use elements of every tactical force and covert organization they have. And they will go to any length to achieve success.

## THE THREAT IN THE REAR AREA

Because of the lethality and range of modern weapons systems and because of the enemy's intent to strike deep, units in rear areas will be as vulnerable to enemy action as units in the MBA. Operations to combat the Threat in the rear area will compete for the tactical commander's attention and combat resources.

*The danger to rear areas increases the importance of the MP as a source of combat power in the rear area. The battlefield commander may not have enough reserve forces dedicated to the rear area to confront the Threat. If this occurs, he may depend on the MP for support. MP are one of the first mobile fighting forces available to fight the rear battle.*

### THREAT INTENSITY

The enemy activity in a rear area is nominally divided into three levels of intensity. The levels do not imply a progression in the intensity of hostilities. They merely indicate the level of intensity of a given activity occurring at a given time. Enemy activity can occur any place in the rear at any level of intensity. And it may occur many places at once in varying levels of intensity.



	THREAT ACTIVITY LEVEL I			THREAT ACTIVITY LEVEL II		
	TYPE OF FORCE			TYPE OF FORCE		
	AGENTS	TERRORISTS	SYMPATHIZERS	<i>SPETNAZ</i> <sup>5</sup> SPECIAL-PURPOSE FORCES	LONG-RANGE RECON TEAMS	TROOP RECON GROUPS
<b>SIZE AND COMPOSITION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individuals/small cells</li> <li>- Part of organized network</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individuals/small groups (3-18 members)</li> <li>- Specially-trained and -organized underground elements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Individuals/small groups</li> <li>- May be open to recruitment by Threat agents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Usually squad-size or smaller, may be platoon- or company-size</li> <li>- Highly trained in demolitions, burglary, communications, languages</li> <li>- Skilled officers and senior NCOs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Found at division level</li> <li>- Specially selected and trained</li> <li>- 5- to 12-man team</li> <li>- 6 to 8 teams</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 12-man (+/-) troop recon groups w/3 vehicles</li> <li>- 6-8 groups per MR and tank division, 2-3 groups per MR and tank regiment</li> </ul>
<b>METHODS AND MISSIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Act alone, recruit others with access to target</li> <li>- Conduct clandestine surveillance, sabotage</li> <li>- Gather intelligence</li> <li>- Identify military units</li> <li>- Provide possible support to Threat special-purpose forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Execute operations with military precision</li> <li>- Act alone, in small groups</li> <li>- Exploit vulnerabilities</li> <li>- Use violence, speed, surprise</li> <li>- Conduct sabotage, armed attacks, thefts of military supplies, equipment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Act alone, join other sympathizers</li> <li>- Conduct random acts against targets of opportunity</li> <li>- Pick own time, place to strike</li> <li>- Avoid well-protected targets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deploy by parachute, helicopter, vehicle, foot, boat</li> <li>- Dress in HN, friendly forces uniforms/civilian clothes/standard Threat airborne uniform</li> <li>- Perform recon, sabotage, intelligence collection</li> <li>- Also mislead/disrupt/destroy enemy forces, prepare for large-force incursions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deploy by airdrop or infiltration</li> <li>- Collect information by observation, ambush, raid, interrogation</li> <li>- Conduct recon for avenues of approach into division/corps rear areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Move by scout recon vehicles/infantry fighting vehicles/medium tanks</li> <li>- Use roads until contact made/expected</li> <li>- Conduct ground recon for avenues of approach to brigade, division rear areas, reserves, enemy boundaries</li> </ul>
<b>LIKELY TARGETS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nuclear, chemical weapons and delivery means</li> <li>- Radar, air defense, communications sites</li> <li>- Logistical centers/clusters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Civilian, US and HN military officials and families</li> <li>- Commercial/military facilities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Convoys, communications lines</li> <li>- Public utilities, remote radar/communications sites</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nuclear weapons storage sites and launch systems, CPs, air defense systems, air bases, communications sites</li> <li>- Convoys, pre-positioned war stocks, reserve units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nuclear delivery means</li> <li>- Command, control, and communications facilities</li> <li>- Radar sites</li> <li>- Troop locations, movements</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nuclear weapons and delivery means</li> <li>- Defensive positions</li> <li>- Command HQ, signal centers</li> </ul>
<b>PROBABLE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- From simple burglar tools to sophisticated cameras, listening devices, long-range secure radios</li> <li>- Silenced automatic weapons, sniper rifles, explosives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Automatic pistols, assault rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, small explosives</li> <li>- Hand-held and other radios</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Small automatic weapons, explosives</li> <li>- Weapons and equipment bought, stolen, homemade, or supplied by Threat agents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Full complement of explosives, incendiary devices</li> <li>- Possible NBC weapons</li> <li>- Hand-held antitank, antiaircraft weapons</li> <li>- Automatic weapons with flash suppressors and silencers</li> <li>- Long-range secure radios</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Explosives, incendiary devices</li> <li>- Assault rifles, antitank grenade launchers, light machine guns</li> <li>- Secure radios</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ATGLs, assault rifles, ATGMs, portable SAMs, light machine guns, 7.3-mm guns, 14.5-mm and 7.62-mm machine guns</li> <li>- T-64/T-72/T-80 medium tanks, wheeled scout recon vehicles, tracked infantry fighting vehicles</li> </ul>
<b>EXPECTED AREA OF OPERATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Divisions, corps, TA rear areas</li> <li>- In, near populous/industrial areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Possible activity in corps rear area</li> <li>- Probable activity in TA rear area</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Possible activity in divisions and corps rear areas</li> <li>- Probable activity in TA rear area</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Division, corps, TA rear areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Division, corps rear areas</li> <li>- Teams operate 100 km forward of main body</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operates on width of 20-30 km on 3-4 axes</li> <li>- Up to 50 km from FEBA in conventional conflict</li> <li>- 50-100 km in nuclear environment</li> </ul>

THREAT  
ACTIVITY  
LEVEL  
CONTINUED  
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LEGEND:

ATGL - ANTITANK GRENADE LAUNCHER  
ATGM - ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE

FEBA - FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA  
HN - HOST NATION

MR - MOTORIZED RIFLE  
SAM - SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

TA - THEATER ARMY  
CP - COMMAND POST

THREAT ACTIVITY LEVEL III					
TYPE OF FORCE			TYPE OF FORCE		
HELIBORNE FORCES	AMPHIBIOUS FORCES	AIRBORNE FORCES	FORWARD DETACHMENTS	OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUPS	
<b>SIZE AND COMPOSITION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Company-size to reinforced battalion-size</li> <li>- Found in MR divisions/air assault brigades</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Platoon-size to brigade-size</li> <li>- Elite naval infantry (Marine) units</li> <li>- Much like motorized rifle units</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Company- to division-size</li> <li>- Elite parachute divisions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reinforced battalion- to regiment-size</li> <li>- Found in 1st echelon MR, tank divisions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reinforced division to multiple division</li> <li>- Usually reinforced by airborne/airmobile forces</li> <li>- Organic CS elements</li> </ul>
<b>METHODS AND MISSIONS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Insert by helicopter</li> <li>- Destroy nuclear weapons storage sites and launch systems, major logistical facilities, other targets in rear area</li> <li>- Seize key terrain</li> <li>- Exploit results of tactical operations or penetrations</li> <li>- Pursue withdrawing enemy forces</li> <li>- Conduct deception operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deploy by ship/amphibious craft</li> <li>- Perform commando-type raids, recon, sabotage missions</li> <li>- Operate alone/with ground forces</li> <li>- Seize key coastal/island positions to create diversions, inflict damage, near coast</li> <li>- Flank enemy forces</li> <li>- Recon, report targets of naval significance</li> <li>- Help ground/naval units destroy enemy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Deploy by fixed-wing aircraft/helicopters</li> <li>- Encircle enemy forces</li> <li>- Destroy nuclear delivery means</li> <li>- Seize key terrain, airheads, river-crossing sites</li> <li>- Exploit weak areas, results of nuclear strikes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Penetrate MBA</li> <li>- Open multiple avenues for larger forces</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Usually committed by Front or Army before 1st echelon battle ends and before 2d echelon forces are committed</li> <li>- Usually deployed as tank-heavy operational raid force</li> <li>- Attack at high speed on a separate axis to strike intermediate targets without becoming decisively engaged</li> </ul>
<b>LIKELY TARGETS</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Nuclear weapons storage and launch systems</li> <li>- Command and control HQ, major logistical clusters, early warning systems</li> <li>- Key terrain, airfields, reserve forces, avenues of approach to corps rear area</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Operational landings: naval bases, major islands, important coastal objectives</li> <li>- Tactical landings: airfields, ports, other objectives</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategic assaults: air bases, seaports, industrial complexes, capitals</li> <li>- Operational/tactical assaults: bridgeheads, LZs, DZs, river-crossing sites, command and control HQ, nuclear delivery means</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Disrupt/destroy enemy forces</li> <li>- Seize/hold key terrain</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Front OMGs: politically/economically significant centers, large rear area targets, nuclear weapons, reserves, airfields</li> <li>- Army OMGs: all of the above plus command, control, communications facilities; withdrawing troops</li> </ul>
<b>PROBABLE WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assault rifles, heavy/light machine guns, ATGLs, ATGMs, SAMs, mortars, wheeled scout recon vehicles</li> <li>- Automatic grenade launchers, recoilless guns, antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, (SP), tracked infantry fighting vehicles, tactical air support</li> <li>- Air assault forces will be heavily equipped</li> <li>- MR units will be stripped of heavy equipment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assault rifles, heavy/light machine guns, ATGLs, ATGMs, SAMs, mortars, wheeled scout recon vehicles</li> <li>- Amphibious armored personnel carriers, light and medium tanks, MRLs (SP), antiaircraft guns (SP), recoilless guns, tactical air support</li> <li>- Air-cushioned amphibious vehicles, landing ships</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assault rifles, heavy/light machine guns, ATGLs, ATGMs, SAMs, mortars, wheeled scout recon vehicles</li> <li>- Automatic grenade launchers, assault guns (SP), antiaircraft guns (towed), MRLs (towed), artillery (towed), tracked infantry fighting vehicles, tactical air support</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assault rifles, heavy/light machine guns, ATGLs, ATGMs, SAMs, mortars, wheeled scout recon vehicles</li> <li>- Recoilless guns, antiaircraft guns (SP)</li> <li>- Amphibious armored personnel carriers, tracked infantry fighting vehicles, medium tanks</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Assault rifles, heavy/light machine guns, ATGLs, ATGMs, SAMs, mortars, wheeled scout recon vehicles</li> <li>- Antiaircraft guns (SP), MRLs (SP), artillery (SP) (towed)</li> <li>- Tracked infantry fighting vehicles, amphibious armored personnel carriers, medium tanks, attack/support helicopters, tactical air support, organic CS elements</li> </ul>
<b>EXPECTED AREA OF OPERATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Force from MR unit operates 15-25 km from FEBA, linkup w/advance ground forces w/in 4-6 hr</li> <li>- Force from air assault brigade operates up to 50 km from FEBA, no immediate linkup required</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Specific islands, ports, inland waterways, coastal regions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Tactical assaults up to 100 km from FEBA</li> <li>- Operational assaults up to 300 km from FEBA</li> <li>- Strategic assaults up to 1000 km from FEBA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Brigade, division, corps rear areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Division, corps rear areas</li> </ul>

LEGEND: AT - ANTITANK GUIDED MISSILE  
DZ - DROP ZONE

LZ - LANDING ZONE  
MRL - MULTIPLE ROCKET LAUNCHER

OMG - OPERATIONAL MANEUVER GROUP  
SP - SELF-PROPELLED

**The full range of Threat levels must be expected.** Agent activity will occur. Sabotage will occur. Special-purpose forces will attack targets at one place to draw forces away from key targets elsewhere. These forces will attack targets of opportunity anywhere, Enemy tactical reconnaissance units will seek information throughout the rear area. Reconnaissance teams will be operating up to 100 kilometers behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). See Appendix B for metric conversion table. Airborne and air assault operations will be underway to link up with advancing ground forces. Special-purpose airborne assaults will raid nuclear weapons sites. Naval infantry will land on the coast to seize ports or surround friendly forces in that area. And while this is happening, Threat forces will conduct tactical air, artillery, and missile strikes in advance of their forces moving forward through the MBA.

#### THREAT LOCATION

*The likelihood of MP units encountering and engaging in direct combat against rear area. Threat forces is high at all battlefield echelons.* On an extended battlefield, the idea that the danger to the rear area decreases as you travel farther away from the FEBA is not true. Threat intensity depends not on geographical location, but on what operations the enemy believes must be mounted, and to what degree, to achieve its objective in the rear area.

**At division-rear battlefield depth, the full spectrum of Level I and II activity will occur, Level III incursions of company-size airborne or air assault forces can be expected in the division rear. Battalion-size incursions may also be expected.**

In the corps rear area, Level I and II activity will be similar in composition and density to Level I and Level II activity in the division rear. But recon activity will be more operational than tactical. Level III incursions of company- and battalion-size forces may be expanded for large airborne or air assault operations.

**Continuing back into the COMMZ,** Level I and II activity will concentrate along lines of communication (LOC) and other areas of military significance. Reconnaissance and Level III incursions will orient on strategic objectives. Incursions of division-size airborne forces to establish and hold airheads are likely to occur behind—or at least close to—the corps rear boundary. Multiple small airborne assaults may also occur.

*What must be clearly understood is that Threat doctrine and Threat technology ensure the rear area is a battle area, not a safe area.* Threat forces coordinate their attacks in the rear area with their attacks in

the MBA. At the same time a full range of Threat activity is occurring in the rear area, Threat forces will be attempting penetrations of the MBA. They will try to push their tank or motorized rifle formations into the division rear areas where they may attack any installation or troop formation they encounter. The technology used by Threat forces increases the likelihood that combat operations of main-battle intensity will spill over into the rear area. The range and mobility of their weapons systems and their ability to carry out deep, fast-moving armor penetrations can intensify the battle in the rear area to the point where it cannot be distinguished from the MBA of previous wars.

## **COUNTERING THE THREAT IN THE REAR AREA**

Disruption of rear area operations directly affects the main battle. US Army forces undertake rear operations to preserve the commander's freedom of action and to assure uninterrupted support of the entire battle. Rear operations ensure logistical flow, continuous CS and CSS, and unimpeded movement of units throughout the rear area.

Rear security operations should be performed without seriously degrading the main mission of support units. Rear operations responses to enemy attacks must be fast enough and strong enough to defeat the enemy. *But* these responses should disrupt friendly operations as little as possible. Forces in the rear must request assistance when they are unable to protect themselves from a threat. Rear operations require sound planning, early warning, timely decisions, and rapid deployment of forces.

Rear security operations include area security and area damage control (ADC). Area security operations counter enemy incursions into rear areas and reduce their impact. ADC limits damage from enemy attacks or natural disaster.

Rear area security operations are conducted by three characteristically different forces: base defense forces, response forces, and TCFs. Depending on the size and nature of the Threat activity, rear area security operations are conducted independently or in a combined effort to defeat the enemy.

### **BASE DEFENSE FORCE OPERATIONS**

Base defense is the keystone of effective rear operations. In the brigade, division, and corps rear, and theater army area command (TAACOM), base commanders are responsible for their own defense. A base commander's planning and training for base defense addresses the full range of weapons on the modern battlefield. However, a base commander's main focus for his base defense force is to meet and defeat the Threat. This Threat may be posed by enemy agents, saboteurs, terrorists, and special operations teams. The commander most often employs a series of defense measures providing internal and perimeter security. His internal reaction forces use organic weapons to neutralize and defeat most low-level Threat activity. Although not fully



equipped to engage major conventional enemy forces that may confront him, a base commander must deploy his personnel to defend themselves until MP or combat forces can respond.

### **RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS**

When faced with Threat forces beyond their capability, commanders of bases or base clusters call for response forces. *MP are an initial response force for units within their AOs.* MP counter the Threat by aggressive patrolling. They keep close watch on likely avenues of enemy approach and possible landing zones (LZs) or drop zones (DZs) to give early warning of rear area enemy activity. They rapidly assess and verify threats to units and bases in the rear. MP identify, intercept, and, when possible, destroy small Threat forces before they can close on their objectives.

Because of their mobility and dispersed employment in the rear area, it is likely that MP may be the first forces on the scene of a Threat insertion in the rear area. When this

occurs, MP destroy enemy elements within their capability. If the attack is by a large force, MP respond to learn the size and intent of the force. They delay and disrupt its progress as much as they can until TCFs arrive. MP are ready to stay and help TCFs defeat the Threat force.

### **TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE OPERATIONS**

Base defense and MP response forces will need help to counter battalion-size or larger forces conducting incursions in the rear area. Combatting heavy enemy forces in the rear area is mainly the responsibility of TCFs. These forces will be task-organized by the G3 and assigned missions by the rear operations officer. They may be a mobile infantry brigade, an element of an armored cavalry regiment, or another force responding to the direction of the commander. When combat forces must eliminate an enemy force in the rear, the tactical commander at the battle site assumes operational control (OPCON) of all elements countering the Threat.

## Military Police Battlefield Missions

**The military police have four battlefield missions.** They ensure battlefield circulation control (BCC). They provide area security. They take charge of EPWs. And they help provide law and order. These missions are composed of a number of combat, CS, or CSS operations. The operations are done independently or in any combination needed to accomplish the missions. The MP, in performing these operations, provide a full range of battlefield support.

Because MP assets are limited, all assets are committed at all times. The specific operations MP units perform at a given time are determined by the echelon commander's need, the intensity of the conflict, and the availability of MP resources. The echelon commander, through the command's provost marshal (PM), sets the priorities of need for MP operations

The PM, aware that not all MP missions can be accomplished all of the time, continuously effects a trade-off between the number and kind of MP operations that the commander requires and the number and kind of MP operations that can be resourced. To inert the priorities set by the commander's tactical plan, the PM recommends allocations of MP assets for MP combat, (CS, and CSS operations

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## THE MP BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL MISSION

**BCC is a major MP battlefield mission. It expedites the forward and lateral movement of combat resources.** In an AirLand Battle this mission assumes more importance than ever before. Travel on main supply routes (MSRs) will be dangerous and extremely difficult. Traffic will be heavy. To reduce the effects of an active NBC environment on convoy operations, military vehicles will be more widely dispersed than on conventional battlefields of the past. Rather than traveling in long convoys, vehicles will move in many small formations. Access to alternate MSRs will be needed almost constantly as sections of MSRs become contaminated or blocked by road obstructions. There will be many stragglers as friendly forces become separated and disorganized by shock effects of nuclear and chemical warfare. Refugees, fleeing in panic in the face of such destruction, will be unlikely to follow the road directions of either civilian or military authorities. Routes set aside for military use can be expected to become clogged with refugees on foot and in privately owned vehicles. As the privately owned vehicles run out of gas, they will be abandoned all along the MSRs, creating further obstructions.

It is through this chaos that commanders must be able to shift elements of their combat forces quickly about the battlefield. Commanders must move widely dispersed tactical units to concentrate them when and where the units are needed. They must receive supplies, replacement personnel, and reinforcing units quickly. They must not have their support blocked by battlefield clutter or their combat operations hindered by refugees flooding MSRs.

MP, operating static posts, performing mobile patrols, and erecting temporary signs on MSRs, expedite military traffic. They move all units quickly and smoothly with the least amount of interference possible. MP in mobile patrols report on the status of key terrain influencing the military road

network. They monitor road and traffic conditions and the presence of NBC contamination in their AOs. Locating alternate supply routes, they reroute traffic to meet changes in tactical situations and route conditions. They rapidly disseminate the information friendly forces need on an ever-changing AirLand battlefield. *MP BCC operations help the commander get his people, supplies, and equipment where he needs them, when he needs them.*

### ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE

As part of their BCC mission, MP conduct route reconnaissance operations to obtain detailed information on routes and on the nearby terrain from which the enemy can influence movement on those routes. MP continually monitor the condition of MSRs. They seek and report on routes that may be used as alternates. MP patrols look for restricting terrain, effects of weather on the route, damage to the route, NBC contamination, and the presence or absence of the enemy. When enemy activity is spotted, MP report it, maintain surveillance, and develop the situation. Seeking information for proposed traffic plans, they look at the type and number of routes that are available. They check load classifications, route widths, obstructions, and restrictions.

MP patrols report their observations of conditions on MSRs, including any priority intelligence requirements. The information gathered by the patrols serves as a resource for the combat commander for making operational decisions. It is quickly forwarded through the MP operational headquarters to the rear command post (CP)/rear area operations center (RAOC). It is also forwarded to engineer units to provide engineer commanders with a continuing source of information about route conditions. This information also goes to the echelon traffic controller at division, corps support command (COSCOM), and higher headquarters.

## ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE



### MAIN SUPPLY ROUTE REGULATION ENFORCEMENT

MP undertake MSR regulation enforcement to keep MSRs free for resupply operations. In this way MP units support the command's highway regulation measures. The measures, directed by whichever agency has jurisdiction over the road network in that AO, expedite movement on the MSRs. The measures are stated in the command's highway regulation plan. They also appear in the traffic circulation plan; the engineer route, bridge, and tunnel reconnaissance reports; unit standing operating procedures; and other command directives.

The traffic circulation plan contains the specific measures needed to ensure smooth and efficient use of the road network. It assigns military route numbers and directions of travel. It locates light lines and blackout signs, highway regulation points, and MP traffic control posts (TCPs). Most important to MP, it gives the control classification of routes.

MP ensure classified routes are used only by authorized traffic. Vehicles trying to

travel on roads too narrow for their passage or on roads unable to support their weight can obstruct the route. To expedite traffic on MSRs, MP operate static posts, such as TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, and defiles at critical points. Mobile teams, patrolling between static posts, monitor traffic and road conditions. They gather information on friendly and enemy activity and help stranded vehicles and crews. They also place temporary route signs along MSRs. The signs warn of hazards and act as guides for drivers unfamiliar with a route.

### STRAGGLER CONTROL

MP performing their BCC mission return stragglers to military control. Mobile patrol, TCP, and checkpoint teams do this as part of their day-to-day operation.

Most stragglers are simply persons who have become separated from their command by events on the battlefield. MP direct these uninjured stragglers either to their parent unit or to a replacement unit as command policies dictate. If stragglers are ill, wounded, or in shock, MP give them first aid.

Then they have them moved to the nearest medical facility. MP ensure stragglers attempting to avoid return to their units are escorted to their command.

Following NBC attacks or major enemy breakthroughs resulting in large numbers of lost, dazed, and demoralized military personnel, MP set up special posts for straggler control. Mobile patrols operate between posts and also direct or collect stragglers. When many stragglers are present in a combat theater, straggler collecting points are also needed. If allied forces are present in the theater, each nation establishes a straggler collecting point for its own personnel. MP teams are aware of each location. Using whatever transport is available, MP transfer stragglers from TCPs and checkpoints to a straggler collecting point. There they are screened and sorted for removal to a medical facility or returned to their units to reconstitute the tactical commander's combat force.

MP report information about stragglers with whom they come in contact. This information, compiled by the PM section, is then forwarded to the assistant chief of staff, G1. Information given by stragglers that is of immediate tactical value is reported

through the PM to intelligence and tactical operations centers as soon as possible.

### REFUGEE CONTROL

Refugee control operations are the responsibility of G5/S5 and/or host nation (HN) authorities. MP expediting traffic on MSRs may encounter refugee movements, which could hinder military traffic. MP assist, direct, or deny the movement of civilians whose location, direction of movement, or actions may hinder operations. The HN government is responsible for identifying routes for the safe movement of refugees out of an AO. When US commanders receive HN authorization for population movement control, MP redirect refugees to alternate routes established by the HN government.

US military forces do not assume control of refugee movement unless requested to do so by the HN or unless operating in an environment with a hostile government. When the senior commander assumes this responsibility, MP set up TCPs at critical points on the route to direct refugees to secondary roadways and areas not used by military forces.



## **INTELLIGENCE COLLECTING AND REPORTING**

Timely and accurate intelligence can help defeat the enemy threat. Intelligence collecting and reporting play a vital role in supporting commanders on the battlefield. MP collect and report information and intelligence during the normal course of all MP missions. MP efforts support the echelon commander's overall intelligence collection plan. And MP are often specifically tasked to collect information.

In carrying out their BCC mission MP collect intelligence on an almost continuous basis. As MP aggressively patrol, they are able to gather information about the terrain, weather, and activities in their AO. As part of their BCC efforts, they routinely talk to soldiers, local police, and the populace, gathering "human intelligence." They question the local populace about suspicious activity. They also develop contacts with local authorities.

## **INFORMATION DISSEMINATION**

On the AirLand battlefield, swiftly changing combat situations make timely and accurate information about the location of units imperative. MP provide information to soldiers, units, and other road users in the course of all MP missions. In carrying out their BCC mission MP do this on an almost continuous basis. Dispersed throughout broad AOs, MP acquire information from units and persons they encounter. They furnish this information to other MP units in the area, as well as forward it through their operational chain of command. In an AirLand Battle, MP also furnish information about their AO to others who find themselves in areas they do not know. MP inform personnel moving through their AO of recent enemy activity there. They provide directions. They also give locations of supply points and medical facilities. MP provide information about MSRs, critical points, contaminated areas, and holding areas, as well as the general location of major units.

## **THE MP AREA SECURITY MISSION**

**Area security is a major MP battlefield mission. MP perform their area security mission to help the tactical commander provide security and protection in the rear areas.** MP employment for area security may become, at times, of greater importance to the echelon commander than MP employment for BCC. MP provide combat power for rear operations. The intent of the enemy in our rear may be to divert our combat forces from the MBA to the rear area. Commanders planning battles consider the need for forces supporting deep, close, and rear operations. MP employment in the rear area provides commanders with an available light, mobile force that can move, shoot, and communicate.

The AirLand Battle poses unique challenges to a commander's ability to safeguard operations in the rear areas. Against an enemy intent on disrupting its

adversary's rear area operations, a tactical commander's need for rear area security is critical. Command and control headquarters and communications networks must not be disabled. CS and CSS operations must not be disrupted. Protected equipment and commodities are essential for mission success. And special ammunition must have dedicated security. MP also provide security to designated critical assets.

The MP providing area security play a key role in the battle to protect the rear area. They are a response force to enemy attempts to disrupt or demoralize military operations in the rear area. Their mobility makes it possible for them to detect the threat as they aggressively patrol road networks and key terrain features throughout the rear area. Their organic communications enables them to advise the rear CP/RAOC, bases, base clusters, and moving units of impending enemy activity. MP providing area security

in rear operations help to retain overall freedom of action for units fighting the close and deep operations.

### **AREA RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE**

As a part of their area security mission, MP serve as the eyes and ears of the commander in the rear area by seeking and reporting information obtained by recon patrols. MP units conduct area reconnaissance to gain information to help guard against unexpected enemy attack in the rear area. They gain information about area activity on a planned basis to keep up with

changes in the battlefield environment. Based on the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, they monitor likely avenues of approach and LZs or DZs to give early warning of rear area enemy activity. MP seek specific information about towns, ridgelines, woods, and other terrain features from which the enemy can influence movements along road networks. They pay close attention to areas near facilities designated critical by the commander, such as key bridges, depots, terminals, logistic support clusters, nuclear ammunition supply points (NASPs), communications centers, and command and control headquarters.



### **SECURITY OF DESIGNATED CRITICAL ASSETS**

MP usually perform their area security mission across their entire AO. But they may be tasked at times to provide security to key personnel and facilities.

MP provide security around critical facilities by operating a mobile security screen. This standoff protection detects and defends against the Threat before it can move within direct fire range of the facilities. MP provide security to critical cells within the corps and TAACOM main CPs.

When MP provide security for the division main CP, they secure the all source production section (ASPS). MP may also provide access-control posts and act as a response force. When the CP relocates, MP provide in-transit security.

MP may provide protective services to key personnel. They may do this by providing access control of restricted areas within CPs. They also may do this by providing close-in personal security. Or they may use in-transit and static security measures around the clock.

MP may provide convoy security for top-priority units transporting especially critical supplies to tactical forces. MP may help secure critical facilities like conventional ammunition supply points (ASPS), pipelines, railways, and deep water ports. Even critical structures, such as dams, bridges, and tunnels, may be secured. But MP are not resourced for this mission, and a trade-off in other MP mission areas will occur.

### **SECURITY OF SPECIAL AMMUNITION**

The security of special ammunition is vital because of the high expectancy of intensive combat operations in the rear and the high priority accorded the ammunition as a Threat target. MP defend this high priority Threat target by using proactive and tactical measures to counter the threat. MP provide security in depth using an all-around perimeter defense. This may be enhanced by military working dogs (MWDs), electronic sensors, and mounted and dismounted

security patrols. MP provide security and route recon for in-transit special ammunition convoys.

### **BASE RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS**

The MP are the base and base cluster commanders' link for detection, early warning, and deployment against enemy attacks in the rear. Information gathered by MP units dispersed throughout the rear area helps apprise commanders of enemy activity near bases. And when the rear CP/RAOC determines the need, MP respond to bases under attack.

A base commander's defense of a base is the cornerstone of the rear operations missions. *The base commander is responsible for the defeat of all Level I threats.* When this threat exceeds his capabilities, he may request MP support. MP near bases and base clusters respond quickly. They consolidate into squads or platoons and arrive to help defend against the threat.



### **COUNTERINCURSION OPERATIONS**

MP conduct counterincursion operations to discover the enemy. Their intent is to keep the enemy from dictating the time and place of an encounter. Threat doctrine sets high

priority on capturing or incapacitating special weapons ammunition storage and delivery means. Equally important objectives are communications nodes and centers and air bases. General-purpose MP units providing area security operate near many



of these objectives. Organic special-purpose MP security companies are often part of the main defense element for these bases. Thus it is likely that MP will come in contact with incursions of enemy tactical units with great frequency.

The MP are *the response force for Level II threats in the rear area*. MP act to small enemy incursions attempting to gain access to LZs, DZs, and avenues of approach to critical assets. MP also react to airborne, airmobile, or ground incursions in the rear area.

For *Level III incursions*, MP respond to learn the size and apparent intent of the Threat. They stay to monitor Threat activity and to delay or disrupt its progress. If the MP are tasked by the G3 to delay a Level III threat, the MP commander (PM/MP brigade commander) will consolidate MP assets, take OPCON of other forces specified to support, and execute a delay until the TCF arrives. The MP assist in moving the TCF into position, brief the TCF commander on the tactical situation, and, if tasked to do so, stay to help defeat the Threat.

### **AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE OPERATIONS**

On the AirLand battlefield, air support of ground operations is imperative. The US Army has assumed the mission of providing exterior defense against ground attack of US Air Force bases. If MP are tasked to defend air bases, they will defend with aggressive defense tactics. MP employ screening measures, mounted and dismounted patrols, and the use of listening posts (LPs), observation posts (OPs), and defensive positions located on key terrain. Where agreements so specify, the HN will assume the external air base ground defense (ABGD) mission.

### **TERRORISM COUNTERACTION**

In a theater of operations, MP conduct terrorism counteraction to maintain or restore control in areas vulnerable to

terrorist actions. MP use both reactive and offensive actions to attempt to destroy terrorist operations in the rear area. MP counteractions include raids and rescues as well as shows of force and intelligence gathering. MP coordinate terrorism counteraction with HN officials. This coordination ensures MP action accords with the HN internal defense policy.

### **AREA DAMAGE CONTROL OPERATIONS**

MP units take measures to support ADC before, during, and after hostile actions or natural and man-made disasters. In the AirLand Battle, ADC takes on added significance. MSRs damaged by enemy NBC action can become contaminated or unusable from battlefield clutter. ADC operations help reduce the level of damage or lessen its effect. This helps restore combat operations and support. Maximum use should be made of any HN capabilities. MP provide support that includes but is not limited to BCC, refugee control, straggler control, NBC detecting and reporting, and some local physical security when required.

MP will report and block off affected areas. They also secure critical activities and reroute battlefield movement to alternate road net works.

### **NBC DETECTING AND REPORTING**

On the AirLand battlefield the need to detect, report, and mark NBC hazards is significant. MP play a vital role in NBC operations by detecting, monitoring, and reporting the presence of NBC hazards. They do this in the course of performing any of their MP missions. As part of their area security mission, MP moving off-road for area reconnaissance and other area security operations are especially well suited to detect NBC hazards. Each MP team has equipment to do so. And because MP are mobile and have communication assets, they can detect and monitor large areas. Once an NBC hazard has been detected MP monitor the

hazard, mark the area, and report its status through their operational channels. MP can direct units to bypass contaminated road

networks or areas. MP performance of this operation is essential to the early detection of NBC hazards in the rear area.

## THE MP ENEMY PRISONER OF WAR MISSION

The MP EPW mission is of humane as well as tactical importance. In any conflict involving US forces, safe and humane treatment of EPWs is essential. MP ensure this is accomplished. MP perform their EPW operations to collect and evacuate EPWs throughout the theater. In an AirLand Battle, many EPWs can be expected to be captured. Entire units of enemy forces, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may be captured. This will place a tremendous challenge on tactical forces and their commanders. Tactical commanders must have their forces available for combat. But at the same time they must resolve the problem of removing EPWs from an MBA. *MP support tactical commanders by undertaking EPW operations. They relieve the tactical commander of the need to use his combat forces to do this.*

### EPW COLLECTION OPERATIONS

MP tasked with EPW operations collect EPWs and civilian internees (CIs) from combat units and from other MP units in the area. MP make these collections as far

forward as possible. MP operate collecting points and holding areas to briefly retain EPWs and CIs until they can be evacuated to the rear. They safeguard and maintain accountability of EPWs and CIs at all times. They protect them and provide humane treatment for them.

### EPW EVACUATION OPERATIONS

MP ensure that EPWs and CIs are evacuated from collecting points and holding areas as soon as possible. They accept accountability for EPWs and CIs. And they safeguard them while evacuating them promptly to the rear.

### EPW INTERNMENT OPERATIONS

In a mature theater of operations, MP escort guard companies, guard companies, and prisoner of war processing companies guard and process EPWs and CIs collected by MP teams in the combat zone. MP units also guard EPWs and CIs at camps in the COMMZ, in allied countries, or in the continental US (CONUS). *EPW internment operations are discussed in detail in FM 19-40.*



## THE MP LAW AND ORDER MISSION

The MP law and order mission extends the combat commander's command and control. MP perform their law and order operations to suppress the chance for criminal behavior and to confine US prisoners. They conduct law and order operations only when the combat commander requires it and when battle intensity permits. The commander's need for these operations depends on the tactical situation.

During intense and continuous combat like that expected in a developing theater of operations, MP are needed to expedite and conserve vital resources for combat forces. The need for MP to perform law and order operations increases during lulls in battle or in areas not actively involved in combat operations. Law and order operations are more likely to be performed in a mature theater of operations.

### LAW ENFORCEMENT

MP law enforcement operations help the commander keep his command combat efficient. MP maintain liaison activities with other Department of Defense police organizations and with HN authorities and allied police agencies. MP at all levels coordinate actions to remove conditions promoting crime and to reduce opportunities allowing crime.

*Law enforcement operations on the battlefield are most often done as a part of other MP operations.* MP perform physical security measures as part of their area security operations for designated critical assets and for special ammunition. They regulate traffic and investigate accidents as a part of their BCC mission. They investigate deaths or special accidents only when the commander directs them to do so and in the absence of HN agreements. Investigations will often be conducted by HN authorities. Crime prevention measures and selective enforcement measures are also performed as part of other missions.

During stand-down periods, courtesy patrols may be performed by non-MP if the commander so directs. *Law enforcement considerations are discussed in detail in FM 19-10.*

### CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

MP investigate offenses against US forces or property committed by persons subject to military law. There are two types of criminal investigations on the battlefield. Minor crimes usually are investigated by MP investigators. During periods of combat, few MP investigations of minor incidents will be required. Major incidents involving death, serious bodily injury, and war crimes are referred to investigators of the United States Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). They provide criminal investigation support to all US Army elements. *A more complete discussion of USACIDC support to the battlefield is in Chapter 11.*

### US MILITARY PRISONER CONFINEMENT

MP detain, sustain, protect, and evacuate US military prisoners. Whenever possible, soldiers awaiting trial remain in their units. Only when they present a hazard to the mission, themselves, or others are they placed in pretrial confinement under the control of MP. Convicted military prisoners are moved as soon as possible to confinement facilities outside the AO.

MP confinement operations parallel, but are separate from, the MP EPW evacuation system. A confinement facility is maintained within the theater of operations only if distance or lack of transportation for prisoners demands it. When military prisoners are retained in-theater, temporary detention facilities may be established in the combat zone and in the COMMZ.

### TERRORISM COUNTERACTION

As part of their law and order mission, MP effect terrorism counteraction to prevent or

defeat terrorists operating within MP jurisdiction. MP antiterrorist and counterterrorist measures include implementing installation vulnerability assessments, developing procedures to detect terrorist actions before they occur, hardening likely targets, and offensive action to attempt to

destroy terrorist elements when necessary. Specially trained MP provide protective services to protect key personnel against terrorist actions and conduct hostage negotiations to obtain the safe release of captives. *For a detailed discussion, see FM 100-37.*

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## CHAPTER 4

# Military Police Battlefield Organization

**The military police support commanders at every echelon throughout a theater of operations.** The geographical net of MP units extends across both the combat and communications zones. Wherever they are, MP units at each level of command respond to the operational needs of commanders.

The size of the MP force and the distribution of MP assets supporting a theater of operations depend largely on a number of issues affecting the conflict. If the conflict is fought as part of a wartime coalition of forces, the shared cost of supporting the forward deployed forces is far less than the total cost imposed by a unilateral action. Manpower obligations are also reduced. Protecting LOC and facilities can be a shared responsibility. No one MP force would be called on to protect them unassisted. But in a unilateral operation, like the conflict over the Falkland Islands in 1982, a single military force can expect to obligate a large portion of MP assets to operate and protect critical LOC and facilities.

If a conflict erupts in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) country, the friendly HN can, to some extent, relieve US commanders of the need to provide forces for security and logistical support in the COMMZ. In hostile territory the problems encountered by commanders can be extremely manpower-intensive. If a commander does not have support from the local government, he must obligate much of his MP force to counter interference to his military operations from a hostile population. And he will need a larger MP force, or he will need to divert other military resources to protect his LOC.

If a conflict occurs in a developed country, the road networks and other transportation

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means of an industrialized nation are a distinct advantage to commanders moving much-needed material and supplies. But in a developing country movement over large areas may depend on the presence of one good road. Enemy forces interdicting that MSR can wreak havoc with military operations. Adequate MP support on such an MSR becomes imperative.


If a conflict is fought in a theater of operations where policy permits EPWs to be evacuated out of the theater, MP forces required for in-theater prisoner of war internment would be limited to those units needed to intern EPWs until evacuation to CONUS commences. Out-of-theater manning would eliminate the need to move large numbers of MP units into a theater to handle an EPW flow that surges during offensive operations only to wane during defensive periods. Out-of-theater manning not only saves valuable space on aircraft bringing in

MP EPW personnel and equipment, but also significantly reduces the drain on the supply system. In-theater EPWs and MP EPW personnel must all be fed, clothed, and otherwise sustained.

Within any theater there may be a unified or a combined command. A theater army (TA) is the US Army component of a unified command. The TA organizes, equips, trains, and provides Army forces to support the needs of its theater of operations. It provides communicative, logistical, and administrative support for US forces in the theater. It coordinates HN support and rear operations in the COMMZ. It provides security and maintains discipline in the COMMZ. It also

may be tasked to provide logistical support, such as supply, engineer, and health services, to allied forces in the TA sector.

In an established theater, the territory is divided into a COMMZ and a combat zone. The TA headquarters and functional commands operate in the COMMZ. The territorial responsibility for the combat zone is assigned to a number of corps. For ease of tactical control the combat zone is divided into AOs, one for each corps. Each corps area is subdivided to provide an AO for each division. MP units are assigned to the TA and its subordinate commands to provide MP support throughout the theater of operations.



## MP SUPPORT IN THE COMMZ

In the COMMZ, MP support is provided to the TA by a TA PM and by MP units assigned to TA subordinate commands. MP units are assigned to the TAACOMs, the personnel command (PERSCOM), the transportation command (TRANSCOM), and to the TA's petroleum group, ordnance group, and special ammunition ordnance brigade.


Most MP units in the COMMZ are assigned to TAACOMs. An MP brigade is assigned to each TAACOM to support the forces operating within that TAACOM's AO. The MP brigade commander is the TAACOM's PM. MP assigned to a TAACOM perform all four MP battlefield missions. They provide combat, CS, and CSS operations within their TAACOM's AO.

MP units assigned to other TA subordinate commands in the COMMZ perform only the one MP mission those commands need. MP are assigned to the PERSCOM to support that command's internment and confinement missions. They process, evacuate, and intern EPWs and CIs and confine US military prisoners. MP are assigned to the TRANSCOM and the TA's petroleum group, ordnance group, and special ammunition brigade to provide security of designated critical facilities and supplies. *See Chapter 7 for further discussion of MP support to TAACOMs. See Chapter 8 for MP support to the PERSCOM and Chapter 9 for MP support to the TRANSCOM, the petroleum group, the ordnance group, and the special ammunition ordnance brigade.*

## MP SUPPORT IN THE COMBAT ZONE

In the combat zone, MP support is provided to each corps, division, and separate brigade. An MP brigade is assigned to each corps. The MP brigade commander is the corps' PM. A separate MP company and PM are assigned to each division. A separate MP platoon and PM are assigned to each separate brigade. The MP units assigned to

corps, divisions, and separate brigades, like MP units assigned to TAACOMs, perform all four MP battlefield missions. They provide combat, CS, and CSS operations within their commands' AOs. *See Chapters 5 and 6 for further discussion of MP support to corps, divisions, and separate brigades.*



## **TYPES OF MP UNITS**

Most MP units supporting a theater of operations perform all four MP missions. These units are assigned to TAACOMS, corps, divisions, and separate brigades. They provide all forms of MP support to the forces operating within their AOs.

Other MP units are special-purpose, or "functional," units and perform one MP mission. Most of these units are assigned to the PERSCOM, the TRANSCOM, and the

TA's petroleum group, ordnance group, and special ammunition ordnance brigade. These functional MP units are introduced into a theater of operations when their "parent" TA unit is required. Nearly all functional MP units, like the TA units to which they are assigned, are located in the COMMZ. But some functional MP units, like those providing security for special ammunition, move to other locations to accompany the units handling the commodity the MP secure.

## **TYPES OF MP COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS**

MP units are assigned to, attached to, or placed under the OPCON of units they support. Their command and control relationship may be changed briefly to provide better support for a specific operation.

From TA level down to division, MP units are assigned to their supported command on a long-term basis. This is true for MP units assigned to TAACOMS, corps, divisions, and separate brigades. It also applies to those functional MP units supporting the PERSCOM, the TRANSCOM, and the TA's petroleum group, ordnance group, and special ammunition ordnance brigade.

This command and control relationship may be changed briefly to provide better support for a specific operation. MP units are sometimes placed under the OPCON of another unit's commander for short-term operations. The MP unit remains in this

relationship only as long as it is needed for that operation. Usually this is for a very short time. For example, a TAACOM MP battalion may be placed under the OPCON of an area support group (ASG) commander for brief operations like response force operations against Level II enemy forces. The ASG RAOC, acting as the ASG commander's agent, assigns the task and directs the battalion's response operations within the ASG's area. Likewise, when heavy security companies are placed under the OPCON of a Lance field artillery battalion commander to provide security for special ammunition, the relationship remains only as long as the MP units are needed to fulfill that function. But when corps MP companies are placed under the OPCON of the division PM to augment division MP assets, the relationship continues for as long as that augmentation is needed, rather than for the length of a particular operation.

## **TYPES OF MP SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

MP units on the battlefield provide either general support (GS) or direct support (DS). Most MP units on the battlefield provide GS. They support their assigned command as a whole. Below division level some MP provide DS. They give their priority of support to particular subelements of their assigned

commands. MP units providing DS are not attached or assigned to the units they support. They remain under the command and operational control of their normal commander. However, they receive and execute operational taskings directly from, and give priority of effort to, the supported subelement.



## MP STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

Throughout the theater of operations, the senior MP officer at each echelon is that commander's advisor and planner for MP operations. He is a member of the command's special staff. The TA PM is the theater's senior PM. He is responsible for staff supervision of MP matters at TA level. In TAACOMs and corps, the MP brigade commanders are also their commands' PMs. At division level and in separate brigades the senior MP officer is the PM.

The PM for each command in a theater of operations is that command's advisor on MP combat, CS, and CSS operations. The PM—

- Ž Advises the commander and staff about MP abilities.
- Ž Prepares plans and policies.
- Ž Coordinates MP operations.
- Ž Assists and supervises interaction of supporting and supported units.
- Ž Reviews current MP operations.
- Ž Coordinates with allied forces and HN military and civil police.

*The PM implements the commander's policies and plans. He ensures MP plans and operations supporting the commander's tactical plan are carried out. He recommends when and where to concentrate the command's MP assets. He supervises MP support in the command's AO. He coordinates matters of MP concern on a daily basis.*

The PM's day-to-day work is with the staff officers who supervise MP resources and functions or those whose areas of responsibility influence MP support. The PM coordinates with members of the commander's coordinating and special staffs. He works closely with the G3 section to provide MP support for tactical route movements. He coordinates BCC for logistical and administrative ground movements with the G4. He coordinates EPW and CI matters with the G1 and the G2. When needed, he coordinates

with the G4 and the G5. On matters pertaining to security of CPs, he coordinates with the headquarters commandant.

PMs ensure MP planning is practical and flexible. They see that plans are coordinated with staff sections and subordinate commands. They make sure plans reflect manpower and resources needed by MP. (This includes needs for command and control, fire support, equipment, and supplies. It also includes construction, communication, transportation, and aviation support.) As new information is received, PMs review, update, and modify plans. The PMs see that the echelon commanders get the MP support they need.

In the absence of specific directions or orders, the PM plans the use of MP assets. He evaluates current operations and projects future courses of action. He bases his plans on assumptions consistent with sound judgment and a thorough knowledge of the situation and mission. The PM considers the—

- Ž Factors of METT-T.
- Ž Current IPB.
- Ž Environment within the area. This includes climate, terrain, and obstacles. It includes width, depth, size, and location of built-up areas. It includes attitudes and abilities of the local populace.
- Ž Kinds of units operating in the area.
- Ž Number of units in the area.
- Ž Missions and capabilities of these units. (This knowledge is imperative for base planning in the rear area.)
- Ž Specific missions of MP units in the area and the impact that rear area security operations will have on the ability of these units to support command headquarters.
- Ž Personnel, vehicles, and equipment in the MP units.

Coordination and communication among PMs and combat commanders are essential. Such actions ensure timely and efficient MP support to the division, corps, and TA during a conflict. The informal technical chain of coordination is an open line of communication between MP in different echelons. Through it the division PM maintains a link with the next higher echelon of MP support, the corps PM. The corps PM, in turn, maintains a link with the TAACOM PM. There is a technical link from the corps PM to each of the TA's other subordinate commands and elements. But the corps PM usually deals directly only with the TAACOM PM. For support from other elements of the TA, both the corps PM and the TAACOM PM go to the TA PM. However, if an MP unit of one of the other TA elements is near a corps area or a TAACOM AO requiring support, direct coordination can be conducted.

To speed coordination the PM uses the informal technical chain of coordination. This informal coordination enhances the MP support provided at each echelon. It also

fosters cooperation and help among the MP elements at each echelon. For instance, if the division PM needs more assets to accomplish added missions, he uses his technical link with the corps PM. He requests X amount of MP assets to do the added missions. He explains that his division MP assets are totally committed. The corps PM assesses his own assets to see if he can provide the requested support. If the corps PM can provide support, the problem of how to do the added missions is solved. If, however, the corps PM needs all corps MP assets to accomplish corps MP missions, the division PM notifies the G3 that corps MP assets are not available without commander to-commander evaluation of MP mission priorities. The division commander talks to the corps commander. If they decide support should be provided, the corps commander then directs the change in priorities and the corps PM provides the assets. But the echelon commander may decide corps assets cannot be used to support the division's mission. In that case, support for those missions is delayed until division or corps MP assets are free to do them.

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## Military Police Support to Divisions and Separate Brigades

**Military police units in divisions and separate brigades provide essential support to forward tactical commanders.** Support is concentrated on MP combat operations and combat support operations. MP expedite the forward and lateral movement of combat resources. They evacuate EPWs from forward areas. They provide security for the main CP, and they operate EPW collecting points. They provide combat power; they are often an initial response force against the Threat in a command's rear area.

MP units are not resourced to perform all four MP missions at the same time. Because the need for MP support exceeds MP assets, careful planning of MP employment is essential. For MP units supporting divisions and separate brigades the need for flexible employment is critical. Flexible employment enables MP units to respond to the constantly changing tactical situation,

The PM plans the use of all MP assets supporting a division or a separate brigade. Anticipating the support needs of the combat commander, the PM plans MP employment to meet the commander's needs. The PM bases his plan on the tactical commander's concept of operation and intent. After learning the commander's concept of operation and estimating the situation, the PM decides which MP missions are critical to accomplish the commander's mission. He then recommends allocation of resources. And he tasks his assets to undertake the missions in the order of priority that supports the combat commander's tactical plan.

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### MP SUPPORT TO DIVISIONS

A division is the basic unit of combined arms services of the Army. It is the smallest unit in the Army in which all the arms and services are represented in enough strength to permit large-scale operations. MP support to a division is provided by an MP company



assigned to each division. The company provides support in the division and maneuver brigade rear areas. The company is fully mobile in order to frequently relocate under short notice.

## ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION MP UNITS

The organization of MP units supporting divisions is set by tables of organization and equipment (TOE). Division MP companies fall mainly into two categories. They support "heavy" divisions. Or they support "light" divisions. The first category of divisions includes the heavy division and its variant,

the armored-infantry -mechanized (AIM) division. The second category includes the light infantry division and the airborne, the air assault, and the motorized divisions.

Regardless of the category, the assets in a division MP company provide a PM and his supporting staff and the company itself to perform MP missions. The PM controls employment of MP assets in the division AO through his PM section.



The MP company commander directs the employment of company assets. Through his company headquarters he provides administrative, maintenance and logistical support to the PM section and the company's platoons dispersed throughout the division area. The company headquarters contains headquarters, maintenance, supply, and communications sections. These sections are mobile to support the platoons without delay despite the extended distances separating the platoons. (The company commander is also mobile. He, too, travels extended distances from one platoon area to another when checking on the status of his soldiers and resolving the problems affecting mission accomplishment.) Mess support is provided by various division assets because of the company's dispersal throughout the division AO. Personnel administration is provided by the division's support command.

The number and kind of assets in a division MP company and the configuration of its platoons and squads are determined by the type of division to which the company is assigned. *See Appendix A.*

### **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The command and control of MP units supporting divisions extends downward from the tactical commander. The division PM has OPCON of the division MP company and any MP assets that have been provided from corps.

The MP company commander has day-to-day control of the unit. He commands the company and any platoons attached or OPCON from other commands. Each platoon leader directs and supervises his platoon and the execution of its missions.

### **STAFF RELATIONSHIPS**

The PM advises the division commander on matters pertaining to MP operations. He is the MP special staff officer on the tactical commander's special staff. As such, he works for the chief of staff.

### **SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**


The support relationships of MP units supporting divisions differ with the type of division to which the companies are assigned. In the light divisions MP companies are not resourced to provide direct support to maneuver brigades. These MP units provide only general support to their commands.

In the heavy divisions the MP companies provide general support to the divisions' rear areas and direct support to the divisions' maneuver brigades. (When a maneuver brigade receives an MP platoon for direct support, usually, because of distance, logistics, or missions, it is advantageous for the MP platoon to coordinate logistical support with that brigade's commander. For example, instead of performing maintenance at the MP company located in the division rear, the company commander may elect to provide the platoon with a mechanic who operates with a maintenance section in the brigade support area [BSA] to support the platoon's vehicles.) A platoon's DS relationship is seldom interrupted. But sometimes (as in a division-size river-crossing operation) an operation requires all platoons in an MP company to function as a unit. And sometimes, because augmentation from corps has not yet arrived, the PM must place all platoons in a GS role to support the division commander's concept of operation.

### **EMPLOYMENT**

The employment of MP units supporting divisions differs somewhat with the type of division to which the companies are assigned. (See separate discussions that follow.) But some employment considerations remain constant.

In the division, where flexible employment of an austere force is crucial to mission success, the PM must be constantly aware of both friendly and enemy tactical situations. To get current information for projecting MP needs in the division area, he must conduct a split-cell operation. And he must be able to move throughout the division area as needed.



The assets available to the PM include the division MP company and, at times, the division band and/or the MP combat support company from corps that will augment the division. But the division MP company is likely to be the only asset immediately available to the division PM during the initial stages of a conflict. Augmentation by an MP company from corps is not likely to occur at that time, as corps requirements will initially exceed available MP resources. But augmentation from corps can be expected as soon as such augmentation will not degrade the corps commander's concept of operation. When the augmenting assets make up a company, the company is attached to the division. It comes under the OPCON of the PM, who assigns it an AO. The augmenting company is usually given an AO from the division rear boundary forward. The four platoons of that company provide general support in that AO. If division MP are augmented by MP platoons from corps, the platoons are attached to the division MP company as GS platoons. They are placed under the direction of the company commander, who assigns an AO to each platoon.

The division band may be available, at the direction of the division commander, to perform its secondary mission of supporting MP operations. When the tactical situation makes it impractical for the division band to perform its primary mission, the division commander may direct the band to augment the MP company. The band, employed as a unit under the direction of the bandmaster, is under the OPCON of the MP company commander. When available to augment MP assets, the band members provide security at the division main CP. And they can be tasked to provide security of EPWs at the division collecting point. The band is released to perform its primary mission as soon as the tactical situation permits.

#### **MP SUPPORTING HEAVY DIVISIONS**

The employment of MP assets supporting the heavy division and its variant, the AIM division, is very similar. In a heavy division the PM section is organized to support split-cell operations at the main and rear CPs. Because the PM must be mobile to ensure that he is fully aware of the current

status of critical MP operations, the operations officer in one of the PM cells handles the routine operation of the section. He monitors ongoing division operations and MP support. He helps provide long-range planning and interface with the primary division staff. He forwards the PM's taskings to the division MP company commander or augmenting MP company commander. The assistant PM and an operations sergeant are geographically separated from the PM. They set up operations at the other CP. From there they coordinate requirements with division staff personnel.


The company headquarters initially locates near the division rear CP in the division support area (DSA). Once augmentation arrives from corps, the headquarters relocates with one of its GS platoons operating behind the brigade rear boundary.

The MP company supporting a heavy division has either six or five platoons, depending on the type of division. As a general rule, one MP platoon is needed for each maneuver brigade that is to receive direct support. One GS platoon is needed to provide security for the division main CP. The other platoon or platoons secure the EPW central collecting point and perform other MP operations within the division rear.

The MP platoons providing general support to the division locate in the division rear area. A GS platoon's AO is configured on the basis of METT-T, the availability of MP augmentation from corps, and the availability of the division band. One GS platoon locates its platoon headquarters in the DSA. From there it performs BCC and area security. In addition, the elements of this platoon operate the division EPW collecting point. Another GS platoon locates its headquarters in the vicinity of the division main CP. This platoon provides security for the ASPS and some of the security for the CP. It may also have a limited AO in which it performs area security and other MP missions. If there is a third GS platoon, its headquarters is located where it can best support and control the platoon's operations.

The MP platoons providing direct support to the maneuver brigades have AOs coinciding with brigade boundaries. Each platoon headquarters locates within its brigade's support area. To accomplish its missions, a DS platoon must have at least three squads. One squad operates the EPW collecting point. The two remaining squads provide

BCC and area security within the brigade rear. Platoon assets performing EPW operations locate in the BSA. The remainder of the platoon is dispersed throughout the brigade rear. DS platoons conduct BCC and area security within their resources. They also receive and hold EPWs for evacuation to the division rear.



## MP SUPPORTING LIGHT DIVISIONS

The employment of MP assets supporting one of the light divisions varies to some degree with the particular type of light division. The variation will depend on the number and configuration of platoons and squads in the company. But certain MP employment factors remain standard for all

light divisions. Missions are prioritized based on METT-T and the division commander's concept of operation. And the constrained size of a light division MP company makes augmentation crucial to the sustainment of the company performance of its missions.

The PM section is located either in the vicinity of the division main CP or the


vicinity of the rear CP/RAOC. The exact location is based on the current operational status. The PM's responsibilities dictate a need to conduct split-cell operations. But only after augmentation arrives from corps can he do so. The PM cell may initially collocate with the company headquarters near the division main CP. Collocating these limited-resource sections allows them to sustain operations around the clock. It also allows the PM cell access to the company's net control station and other communications equipment. The staff in the PM cell supervises the execution of MP missions and coordinates with members of the division staff located at the division main and rear CPs.

## AIRBORNE DIVISION AND AIR ASSAULT DIVISION MP

The airborne and air assault divisions are light, rapidly deployable units that can conduct parachute or air assault operations. The likelihood of these divisions being used as part of a rapid response force in a low- to mid-intensity conflict as well as in an AirLand Battle is high. MP companies assigned to an airborne or an air assault division, like MP companies assigned to other divisions, are employed to support their division commanders' employment concepts.

Airborne and air assault divisions conduct operations in two phases, an *assault* phase and a *defense* phase. The division accomplishes the assault phase in three stages. They deploy in the first stage. They establish the airhead in the second stage. They extend the logistic base and build their force in the third stage.


In airborne and air assault operations the PM's exact location depends on the current phase of operation. See *FM 71-101 for further information on airborne and air assault division operations*. The company headquarters and one of the platoon headquarters normally collocate with the PM section.





Airborne and air assault MP companies each have four platoons to support their divisions. Airborne MP operate in a DS role for the brigades during the assault phase of their operations. The remaining platoon provides BCC and area security in the vicinity of the division main CP. Air assault MP operate primarily in a GS role for the division. Unlike other divisions, the LOC for an

air assault division may be extensive, stretching for hundreds of miles. Consequently, air assault MP perform BCC and area security to maintain the uninterrupted flow of logistical support to the brigade AOs. Air assault platoons are given AOs extending from the BSAs to the division rear.



Airborne and air assault division MP accompany their divisions during the assault phase to provide MP support to their division's airheads and support areas. Airborne MP generally provide direct support to the maneuver brigades during the assault. But after the assault is complete and the airhead is established, the airborne MP generally go into a GS role. Air assault MP may be employed as a company or by platoons in accordance with METT-T. Depending on the type of operation, air assault MP will generally operate in a GS role although a platoon can be placed in direct support of an air assault task force. A security element from the GS platoon operating in the vicinity of the division main CP also accompanies the initial assault force. It provides security for the division tactical CP. As the assault forces clear the area, division support elements arrive and establish the airhead. The remainder of the division MP company arrives with the division's support elements.

The nature of airborne and air assault operations makes the capture of EPWs likely. Thus, during the first stage of the assault phase, priority of MP support is given to EPW operations. After assembly on the DZ or LZ, MP collect EPWs captured during the assault. Combat elements are relieved of EPWs as far forward as possible, and the EPWs are collected in the airhead. In air assault operations, EPWs may be evacuated by aircraft returning to the operation's staging areas. In airborne operations, EPWs are held for later movement to a central collecting point. Also during the first stage of the assault, MP perform limited straggler and refugee control and undertake recon operations. They also provide security for critical supply storage points when possible.

When the airhead is established in the second stage of the assault, MP support is reevaluated. The priority of MP support normally shifts to BCC. Although vehicle support is limited in the airhead, especially in the early phase of the assault, BCC

measures are needed because few roadnets exist within airheads. BCC measures ensure timely and efficient use of roadways by vehicles needed to support the assault. MP give priority of employment at this time to BCC to speed the movement of combat support vehicles along the narrow corridors to the airhead. Also during the second stage of the assault, MP elements take on much of the EPW and security support requirements. They provide area security in the expanding rear areas created by the outward-bound tactical forces. They begin to move EPWs to the central collecting point for later movement to a holding area.

As the airhead is expanded in the third stage of the assault, MP stress BCC, area security, and EPW operations to support the division commander's tactical plan. When the operation enters its second phase, the defense, MP support expands to include all four MP missions.


### **LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION**

A light infantry division is optimally designed for a low-to mid-intensity conflict. But as the division was designed to be able to sustain itself for only 48 hours of combat operations, augmentation for this division is especially critical. So, too, is augmentation for the division's MP company. The company has three GS platoons to support the division. one platoon is located in the vicinity of the division main CP so its resources can support CP security. Another platoon locates in the DSA and operates the division EPW collecting point. The remaining platoon has an AO configured in accord with METT-T and the commander's priority of MP missions. When required, this platoon evacuates EPWs from the brigade collecting points to the division EPW collecting point. Each GS platoon has a platoon headquarters and three squads. With only two 3-man teams in each squad, a separate squad leader is not provided. The teams are equipped similarly to other division MP teams. However, each team receives training and is equipped to fire man-portable air defense

systems. They are “nondedicated gunners” and engage only those enemy aircraft that are attacking.

As the most austere division MP company, DS platoons are not provided to the maneuver brigades. Their traditional

MP responsibilities within the brigade area are absorbed by the brigades. For example, operation of the brigade EPW collecting point is performed by brigade personnel. The company headquarters and one platoon headquarters generally collocate with the PM section.



## MOTORIZED DIVISION MP

The organization of a motorized division MP company is similar to that of the light infantry division MP company. But this MP company has *two added squads* assigned to the company headquarters. These squads help provide security for the division main CP. They operate outside the CP perimeter, where they provide a 360-degree screen around the CP.

The motorized division is a highly mobile force designed to move quickly over open ground. Consequently, the division's need for BCC operations is significant. The company's three platoons provide general support to the division. Traditional MP responsibilities within the brigade area are absorbed by the brigades. This includes the operation of the brigade EPW collecting point. Direct support to a brigade may be performed. But it is usually done on a specific-mission basis, usually for the most heavily committed brigade.

## MP SUPPORT TO SEPARATE BRIGADES

A separate brigade is used by the Army to inject a small but powerful force where it is needed. It must be able to fight and win while operating on its own for a sustained period of time. It must be able to defend itself on a 360-degree front in a friendly or hostile HN. While there are many variations of separate brigades, it is the heavy separate brigade that is most commonly found within the force. Although this unit has been developed for both armored and mechanized infantry variations, the organization of the MP support remains the same. MP support is provided by an MP platoon assigned to the brigade headquarters and headquarters company (HHC). A separate PM cell within the brigade HHC serves as the command and control element for the platoon.

Support to the platoon and to the PM section for maintenance, supply, mess, and the like is provided by the brigade HHC. As there is no organic support for the platoon or the PM section, close coordination for this support is required. The platoon must compete with other brigade HHC assets for priority of repair for weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment.

### COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control of MP units supporting separate brigades extends downward from the tactical commander. The separate brigade PM has OPCON of separate brigade MP assets the way the division PM has OPCON of division MP assets. The brigade PM also has OPCON of any MP assets that have been provided from corps. The platoon leader directs the execution of his platoon's missions.


### STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

The PM advises the commander of a separate brigade on matters pertaining to MP operations.

### SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

The support relationships of MP units supporting separate brigades differ with the type of brigade to which the platoon is assigned.

In a heavy separate brigade, the MP platoon employs all of its squads to provide




general support to the entire brigade AO. Thus the support relationship of an MP platoon supporting a heavy separate brigade and that of an MP company supporting a light infantry division are the same. The number of squads employed will vary with the brigade's size and the needs of the brigade's missions.

### EMPLOYMENT

The MP platoon supporting a separate brigade can perform any of the four MP battlefield missions. However, its resources are quite limited.

The PM has a small section that operates out of the brigade main CP. The section is not organized for split-cell operation. Corps augmentation is not provided on a routine basis and must be requested.

The platoon supporting a separate brigade has four squads instead of the three found in the division platoon. One squad operates the EPW collecting point while another provides security at the brigade's main CP. The remaining two squads conduct BCC and area security operations throughout the brigade's rear area.



## Military Police Support to Corps

**Corps MP, like division MP, support their command by performing the MP missions critical to the success of their tactical commander's concept of operation.** Corps MP expedite movement of combat resources on MSRs leading into division areas. They aggressively patrol their AOs to protect critical locations and facilities. They remove EPWs from forward areas. And, when directed to do so, they conduct law and order operations.

Corps MP provide combat power within the command's rear area. They perform combat operations to counter Level II enemy forces and to help counter Level III enemy forces. Corps MP also provide a critical link between MP operations in the division and MP operations in the COMMZ. Corps MP support division commanders by helping division MP conduct sustained operations. Corps MP coordinate with division MP for mutual support. They coordinate with MP in the COMMZ to ease operations on the MSR network and movement of EPWs to the rear.

A corps is the US Army's largest tactical organization that has organic combat, CS, and CSS functions. *A detailed discussion of the organization of a corps can be found in FM 100-15.* A control headquarters for two to five divisions of combined arms and services, the corps has many tactical and administrative responsibilities. Its AO, including division areas, may cover up to 35,000 square kilometers.

MP support to a corps is provided by an MP brigade assigned to each corps. The MP brigade provides general support throughout that corps' rear area. Thus subordinate MP units are not assigned to subordinate corps units. Instead, they are given AOs by the MP brigade commander that can be quickly shifted as needed to ensure MP accomplish their missions in accord with the corps

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commander's concept of operation. When possible these AOs coincide with the corps RAO and corps support group areas of responsibility. This flexible employment fulfills the economy-of-force role that most MP have on the battlefield.

In addition to the general-purpose MP units organic to the MP brigade, other, special-purpose, MP units routinely support the corps. MP heavy security companies support the resupply of special ammunition to nuclear-capable units. They provide security for the special ammunition. And MP security companies provide security for conventional ammunition at ASPs and corps storage areas. Although these units operate most often in the corps area, they are usually organic to TA units. *These units are discussed in Chapter 9.*


## ORGANIZATION OF CORPS MP BRIGADES

The MP brigade supporting a corps contains a brigade headquarters and three to six MP battalions. Each MP battalion has three to six MP CS companies. Heavy security companies can be assigned to the battalions when a corps MP brigade has the mission of providing ammunition security for Lance field artillery battalions. See *Chapter 9*.

The CS companies in each battalion have an MP operations center and four standard MP platoons. Each platoon has a 3-man platoon headquarters and three 10-man squads. The standard MP squad consists of 10 MP organized into three 3-man teams and a squad leader. The squad leader is separate from any of his teams. This allows him to spend time with whichever team needs him without causing any team operating in the AO to be short one man. It also ensures the squad leader has a complete understanding of the area given to each team. He can give the platoon leader firsthand information on

all of his squad's area during critical periods of platoon actions for BCC and area security. Operating separately also allows the squad leader to coordinate with the platoon leader and the bases or base clusters in the squad's area to keep the squad sustained.

The MP brigade HHC provides command and control, administrative, and logistical support to the brigade. The brigade HHC consists of a company headquarters and a brigade headquarters that contains the command's immediate staff. The staff officers supervise the major organizational elements. These include the S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, MP long-range plans, communications, and staff judge advocate (SJA) sections. The long-range plans section works with the corps G3 plans element, operating out of the corps main CP. When necessary, the long-range plans section can revert to a PM cell. Because peacetime operations require this section to function as a PM cell, the transition is easily made.




The MP battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD) provides command and control for MP CS companies

and any other MP elements assigned or attached. The battalion HHD consists of a detachment headquarters and a battalion


headquarters that contains the battalion commander's staff. The staff officers supervise the major organizational elements. These include the S1, S2, S3, S4, and com-

munications sections. The support section (not yet present in all units) is vital to an MP battalion commander's ability to sustain his units for BCC and area security operations.



The MP CS company provides support to an assigned AO. The company headquarters provides maintenance, supply, medical, communications, and mess support to the unit. An MP operations center is required to support the unit's operation. The center maintains and plans BCC and area security

operations within the company AO. It operates the transmission equipment when it is needed. In addition, the center has MP investigators for battlefield law and order operations. And it is organized to operate an MP station within a company area when the needs of the command require it.





## COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control in a corps MP brigade is consistent with that of brigades throughout the Army. The MP brigade commander commands the brigade and attached units and personnel. Battalion commanders work for the brigade commander. CS company commanders work for their respective battalion commanders. Platoon leaders receive their orders from their company commanders and direct their platoons to assure their missions are accomplished.

This command and control relationship is sometimes altered. When heavy security MP

companies are present in an MP brigade, the heavy security MP companies are placed under the OPCON of Lance battalions for as long as security is needed for the special ammunition. The heavy security company commanders receive their directions from the Lance battalion commanders.

The command and control relationship is also altered when corps MP assets are sent forward to augment a division MP company. Corps MP companies are attached to the division and placed under the OPCON of the division PM for as long as the unit is needed in the division area.

## STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

The senior MP in a corps MP brigade has two roles. He is the MP brigade commander and the corps PM. As PM, he is a special

staff officer who works for the chief of staff. He advises the corps commander on matters that pertain to MP operations.

## SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

A corps MP brigade provides general support to all US forces operating in its

command's AO. The MP units assigned to the MP brigade provide general support throughout the corps' rear area

## EMPLOYMENT

Each corps MP brigade commander employs his assets in accord with the principles of METT-T and to meet the needs of the US forces operating in his AO. Few MP assets in a corps area are employed to support fixed commitments. Rather, based on broad considerations of the enemy and friendly situation, corps MP are employed to support friendly forces engaged in close and rear operations. MP forces are dispersed throughout the corps area. The concentration of US forces and the number of kilometers of MSR to be controlled influence the dispersion of MP assets. So, too, does the location and vulnerability of critical facilities.

The PM devises his MP concept of operation based on the corps commander's concept and the rear operations officer's

guidance. *His successful employment of MP assets depends on his foreseeing where the battle WILL BE rather than where the battle IS.* Based on the rear area IPB, the MP brigade commander allocates and shifts resources to ensure accomplishment of priority rear area missions.

The ability of the MP brigade commander to shift his assets to meet the needs of the battlefield is crucial to the employment of MP units. To support the forward sustainment of combat units and the safety of CSS units operating in a corps area, the MP brigade commander must quickly shift MP units from one area to another.

To support the MP brigade commander's planning, MP in brigade headquarters operate from several locations. Most of the

staff normally locates in the vicinity of the rear CP where they can interface with the corps staff responsible for the planning and execution of rear operations.

The control element of brigade headquarters must be where it can command and control its subordinate units. The brigade commander and his staff decide the best place to locate this element. The planning elements of the headquarters locate near the corps main CP where they can interface with general, special, and personal staffs of the corps commander. From there they monitor MP operations and integrate MP support with corps plans for future operations. There they can learn the enemy situation through G2 threat analysis almost immediately. Having current intelligence information ensures the MP brigade commander can employ his austere force in the right place at the right time. The detailed information on rear area activities and operations provided by the corps staff enhances the accuracy of his long-range planning.

The brigade S3 section, which provides day-to-day planning and execution of MP missions, locates with the MP brigade headquarters and provides a responsive CP that can relocate frequently on the battlefield. The S3 will normally provide liaison personnel to the corps rear CP and selected COSCOM units.

When possible battalion AOs coincide with the territorial areas of responsibility of the corps RAOC. The MP brigade commander usually tailors battalion AO boundaries to ensure responsive and flexible support on the MSRs leading to the divisions. He pays particular attention to the MSRs behind the most heavily committed division and near critical bases and facilities in that area. But he also ensures MP are available to quickly respond for combat operations in the rear.

The MP brigade commander, coordinating with his battalion commanders, locates the

CS companies where they can provide combat power and general support throughout the corps AO. He bases his decisions on—

- Ž Size of MSR network.
- Ž Number and composition of urban areas.
- Ž Location of CS and CSS facilities.
- Ž Location of critical facilities that may require dedicated security.
- Ž Expected enemy activity.
- Ž Degree and frequency of support needed by divisions.
- Ž Current and projected tactical situation.

This is especially true during the early stages of a war when it is unlikely that an MP brigade commander will have a full complement of CS companies. Augmenting the division MP company with corps MP assets may not be possible at that time. Until it is, the MP brigade commander must locate corps MP assets to help meet the needs of the division while fulfilling the needs of the corps.

Like the brigade commander, battalion commanders plan employment of their companies using the factors of METT-T and the information they receive about the friendly and enemy situations. Certain corps MP employment needs are constant. One MP company must be dedicated to secure the corps main CP. One platoon from that company can be used to secure the corps tactical CP. Assets must be dedicated to operate the corps EPW holding area. Usually this will be a platoon from a second MP company.


In general, battalion commanders place their companies where their assets support the brigade commander's concept of operation. They employ MP to support troop concentrations, bases and base clusters in the rear area, and traffic on the road network, and to defend critical and other likely rear-area targets. They position MP where

they can aggressively patrol critical terrain and monitor LZs and DZs to detect and deny enemy incursions.

They concentrate assets along the road network. From there, they are available to respond to enemy assaults and to expedite the movement of combat resources into the division area. At the same time, other employment needs may be expected.

Battalion assets must be on hand to remove EPWs from division collecting points. And battalion commanders may choose to place a company behind the division rear boundary to ease the coordination between the MP units in the corps area and those in the division area.


If there is a need for a temporary confinement facility in the corps, it is operated by confinement teams organized and trained to



perform confinement operations. But when corps confinement operations are limited to prisoners to be evacuated to a confinement battalion in the PERSCOM, a platoon from a CS company can operate the temporary confinement facility.

When MP heavy security companies are assigned to a corps MP brigade to provide security for Lance field artillery battalions,

they generally operate within the division rear at field storage locations with the firing platoons. The firing platoons provide security for the exclusion area. MP provide security on an outer perimeter. The perimeter is far enough away from the exclusion area to keep enemy forces from destroying the weapons system with their organic weapons and from emplacing a beacon to significantly increase the accuracy of indirect fire.



## Military Police Support to Theater Army Area Commands

**Military police units assigned to TAACOMs perform combat, CS, and CSS operations.** Like MP supporting divisions and corps, TAACOM MP perform the MP missions needed by their supported commanders.

TAACOM MP provide area security to extended LOC within the COMMZ. These supply corridors include ports, inland waterways, railways, pipelines, airfields, and MSR critical points. MP support the users of COMMZ LOC by aggressively patrolling the area through which the LOC pass. They play an important role in rear operations by performing combat operations against the Level II threat. They provide BCC on the COMMZ MSRs leading into the corps rear area. They implement the plans of HN and US staff elements to control the forward movement of combat resources along LOC. They also provide escorts to move US noncombatants from assembly points to theater embarkation terminals. On occasion, in the absence of a PERSCOM in a theater, TAACOM MP also perform the EPW operations and confinement operations more often done by special-purpose MP units assigned to a PERSCOM. *See Chapter 8.*

TAACOMs are command and control elements for units supporting the TA's functional commands and other units located in the COMMZ. The TAACOMs support all forces within their AOs in the COMMZ and as directed in the combat zone. *For detailed information on the organization and functions of TAACOMs, see FM 63-4.* In the

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COMMZ, TAACOM commanders carry out the TA's CSS responsibilities for geographical areas. The number of TAACOMs in a theater depends on the size of the force needed to support the theater. It also depends on the geographical area encompassed by the theater.

MP support to a TAACOM is provided by an MP brigade assigned to each TAACOM. The MP brigade provides general support throughout the territorial area of responsibility of the TAACOM. Thus subordinate MP units are not assigned to subordinate TAACOM units. Instead, they are given AOs by the MP brigade commander that can be quickly shifted, as needed, to ensure MP accomplish their missions in accord with the TAACOM commander's concept of operation.

### ORGANIZATION OF TAACOM MP BRIGADES

The organization of an MP brigade assigned to a TAACOM contains a brigade headquarters and three to six MP battalions.

Battalion and company organization in the TAACOM MP brigade is the same as that in the corps MP brigade. *See Chapter 6.*

However, one of the TAACOM MP brigades in a theater is generally provided two additional MP companies to provide security of the unified command headquarters and the TA headquarters.

The size of a TAACOM MP brigade depends on many factors. It depends on the

number of US forces being supported. It depends on the number of kilometers of MSR and the number of critical facilities being supported. It depends on the availability of HN support. And it depends on the ability of the enemy to project his forces within the TAACOM's AO.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control in a TAACOM MP brigade is consistent with that in brigades throughout the Army. The MP brigade commander works directly for the TAACOM commander. Battalion commanders work for the brigade commander. Company commanders work for their respective battalion commanders. Platoon leaders receive their orders from their company commanders. They direct their platoons to assure the mission is accomplished.

However, this usual command and control relationship is altered briefly for response force operations against a Level II threat. TAACOM MP units operating within an ASG are under the OPCON of the ASG commander for the accomplishment of that operation. As the size of the ASG makes coordination between the ASG and TAACOM impractical for Level II threats,

the ASG RAOC directly tasks MP units operating within the area to respond. Any conflict in mission priorities is resolved through MP command and control channels. *For further information on rear operations in the TAACOM, see FM 90-14.*

A variation of the usual command and control relationships occurs when a PERSCOM is not available in the theater. Then the TAACOM MP brigade becomes responsible for the evacuation and internment of EPWs/CIs and the confinement of US military prisoners. In such a case, a small command and control detachment is added to the brigade to command and control the EPW units operating within the TAACOM. The confinement battalion, however, reports directly to the TAACOM MP brigade. *See Chapter 8 for details on the MP support to the PERSCOM.*

## STAFF RELATIONSHIPS

A TAACOM MP brigade commander, like a corps MP brigade commander, has two roles. He is both MP brigade commander and his command's PM. He advises the

TAACOM commander on matters pertaining to MP operations. As part of the TAACOM special staff, he works for the chief of staff.

## SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

A TAACOM MP brigade supports a TAACOM in much the same way that a corps MP brigade supports a corps. A


TAACOM MP brigade provides general support to all US forces operating in the TAACOM's AO.

## EMPLOYMENT

Each TAACOM MP brigade commander employs his assets in accord with the factors of METT-T and the needs of US forces operating in his AO. Factors affecting his employment include—

- Ž Nature of the operation (unilateral, combined).
- Ž Ability of the HN to provide MP-related support.
- Ž Custody and location of EPWs during internment (US/HN custody, in-theater/ CONUS internment).
- Ž Number of kilometers of MSR in relation to movement control requirements.
- Ž Number and kinds of critical facilities.
- Ž Number of key personnel.
- Ž Ability of the HN to control the civilian populace.
- Ž Resupply strategy.
- Ž Degree of acceptable risk.

TAACOM MP brigade AOs coincide with the territorial area of responsibility of the TAACOM. The MP brigade commander assigns MP battalion AOS by the above factors as well as METT-T. The area of responsibility for an MP battalion, for example, may be a large population center of a larger geographical area in which CSS complexes are located and that includes an MSR. But as employment factors and the mission needs of the TAACOM commander change, so will MP areas of responsibility. The MP brigade commander must move his battalions and companies to tailor his forces to meet current and projected mission requirements. Thus unlike many other TAACOM assets, MP units, which are 100 percent mobile, frequently and rapidly shift AOs. The mobility of MP battalion placement makes it unlikely that battalion AOs will often coincide with the territorial areas of responsibility of the ASGs. This is especially true when the rear operations



commander directs that MP provide ABGD. The use of MP for ABGD immediately and directly impacts adversely on an MP brigade commander's ability to support other MP operations within a TAACOM. In part this is because ABGD is labor intensive. The TAACOM has multiple air bases and their defense can require two or more MP companies per air base.

Most TAACOM MP assets are employed along LOC within areas of high troop concentration. Few TAACOM MP assets are dedicated to support fixed commitments. Each TAACOM MP brigade commander provides dedicated security of his TAACOM's headquarters. In addition, the MP brigade commander in whose AO the theater headquarters and the TA headquarters are located dedicates one company to each of these headquarters for security. If

TAACOM MP units conducting combat operations in the rear capture EPWs, the MP brigade commander also may need to allocate assets to operate temporary EPW holding facilities.

In addition, in a developing theater, MP assigned to a TAACOM MP brigade can expect to perform functions that will later be performed by special-purpose MP units. Traditionally, special-purpose MP units are assigned to the PERSCOM, the TRANSCOM, and other functional TA units. They provide the single-function support needed in a mature theater for the evacuation and internment of EPWs and confinement of US military prisoners. They also provide TA support for the security of special and conventional ammunition and designated LOC facilities. *See Chapters 8 and 9.*

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## Military Police Support to the Personnel Command

**US policy requires that all persons held in Army custody be accorded humane care and treatment from the moment of custody until final release.** The policy applies to detained or interned civilians as well as to enemy military personnel. This policy is equally binding on US capturing troops and on US custodial personnel.

The PERSCOM supports US policy for personnel captured, interned, or otherwise held in Army custody during the course of a conflict. The PERSCOM is a subordinate functional command of the TA. It provides personnel, administrative, morale, internment, and confinement services to a theater of operations. *For a detailed discussion of PERSCOM services, see FM 12-3-4.*

MP support to the PERSCOM is provided by functional MP units. An MP prisoner of war (PW) brigade and a separate MP confinement battalion are assigned to the PERSCOM to support its internment and its confinement missions. The PERSCOM also has an EPW/CI information center attached from TA headquarters. This MP unit is a branch center of the United States Prisoner of War/Civilian Internee Information Cen-

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ter in CONUS. It provides the information, data, and statistics required of all nations under the Geneva conventions.

### THE MP PRISONER OF WAR BRIGADE

The MP PW brigade is responsible for EPW operations for the PERSCOM. It provides firm but humane control of EPWs in a theater of operations. It is responsible for evacuating and processing detainees. It is also responsible for controlling, releasing, and employing EPWs/CIs as set by the Geneva conventions.

But not all EPW support to a theater is provided by an MP PW brigade assigned to a PERSCOM. Because almost all MP units designed to conduct EPW operations are in the Reserve Components, in a developing

theater TAACOM MP assets may be required to carry out many EPW responsibilities until the Reserve Component units arrive to support the PERSCOM.

In a mature theater in which large numbers of EPWs have been captured, EPW requirements on the PERSCOM may exceed the capacity of the EPW brigade. In this instance, an EPW command is established. An EPW command assigned to the TA normally has two or more EPW brigades and operates completely separate from the PERSCOM. When the EPW command

absorbs the MP PW brigade from the PERSCOM, it assumes the PERSCOM's mission of securing and maintaining all EPWs in the theater.

If an HN agrees to secure US-captured EPWs, MP units remain responsible for the processing and retention of EPWs. In this case those few MP units needed to perform this mission are assigned to the TAACOM MP brigade. Cellular teams will locate with the HN PW camps and processing points. A command liaison team will supervise these dispersed teams and the brigade's other EPW operations. The teams will ensure that the HN provides adequate care and security of US-captured EPWs. And they will ensure the HN maintains accountability for them in accord with the Geneva conventions.


And in some theaters, a PERSCOM may not have been assigned. In such a case, special-purpose MP units are assigned to the TAACOM MP brigade to be responsible for EPW operations. Along with these units a

small command and control detachment is assigned to the TAACOM brigade to supervise the units performing processing and internment.

### ORGANIZATION

The PERSCOM MP PW brigade HHC is the command and control element for the brigade's assets. The brigade HHC consists of a brigade command section, a number of staff sections, and a company headquarters.

The brigade has from two to six PW camps. If EPWs are evacuated to CONUS, the brigade contains only the units needed to support the evacuation plan. (The plan will normally include a fixed number of EPW units. The number of units is based on the number of EPWs projected to be captured before transportation to CONUS is available for EPWs. The projection also takes into account "surge requirements" to handle the large numbers of EPWs captured in short periods of time as a result of offensive operations.)




Each camp has a camp headquarters, various staff sections, and a company headquarters. Each camp headquarters is assigned one MP battalion HHD (organized as a "cellular" TOE unit). The battalion headquarters is assigned the guard companies, the escort guard company, and, if

there is one, the processing company supporting the camp.

A camp's operations center on three enclosure sections, each having the capability of securing 4,000 EPWs. Each enclosure section is composed of eight 500-man compounds.


The camp is designed to operate the enclosures in close proximity. This maximizes its use of resources for the security and internment of EPWs. This includes the resources

needed to employ EPWs as a labor force in support of the theater commander's requirements. See FM 19-40 for further information on EPW operations.



Each of the 4,000-man enclosure sections has two guard companies to provide security for the EPWs. These companies have a company headquarters and three platoons. Guard personnel are mobile and have the communications to support the routine move-

ment of EPWs throughout the rear area. While there is a minimum of mobility required to support EPW operations on-site, guard personnel must often move considerable distances with EPW labor parties to reach the place where work is being done.




In addition to the guard companies assigned to the camp, one escort guard company is assigned. It supports the evacuation of EPWs from the combat zone to each camp located in the COMMZ. The escort guard company has a company headquarters and four platoons.

An EPW processing company is provided to each camp designated as a reception camp for newly arriving EPWs to the COMMZ. The processing company contains a company headquarters and three processing platoons that have the MP necessary to process 90 EPWs per hour. In most instances, the processing company requires augmentation of interpreters to facilitate the processing of EPWs.

As EPW units modernize, one of the transitions that will take place is the changeover from EPW camps to EPW battalions. While the camp provides excellent capabilities within the framework for which it was designed, the camp does not provide sufficient

flexibility for all EPW requirements. EPW capture rates and handling may not always support the camp configuration. As a result, the EPW battalion was designed to provide a flexible solution through the use of a modular design. The battalion eliminates the need for a separate processing company and a camp headquarters. Instead, the battalion HHC provides the necessary resources to oversee the processing and handling of 1,000 to 4,000 EPWs.

The battalion HHC has a battalion headquarters, S1 through S4, and EPW administration, finance, medical, work projects, food services, and repair and utility sections. In addition, each of the 500-man EPW compounds is organized into separate companies that are supervised by an EPW company control team located in the S3. Because the battalion has been built with a modular design, the unit is easily tailored to changes in the projected work load (number of EPWs captured) without significantly altering the basic design of the unit.



Each EPW battalion requires guard companies for the security of the EPWs. The assignment of escort guard companies to an EPW battalion is not normally justified based on the limited size of the organization. As a consequence, escort guard companies required to support the evacuation of EPWs from the combat zone are normally assigned to only a few of the battalions. The escort guard platoons are then routinely attached to other battalions to support their operations as required.

In a mature theater in which EPWs are retained in theater, MP units other than the MP PW brigade, camps, and EPW battalions and their associated guard and escort guard companies may be present for EPW operations. There may also be a number of branch camps. They locate throughout the rear area wherever EPWs are needed for use as a labor work force.

#### **COMMAND AND CONTROL, STAFF, AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

The MP PW brigade is a major subordinate headquarters of the PERSCOM. The MP brigade commander commands the brigade and also advises the PERSCOM commander on EPW matters. He works for the PERSCOM commander. Camp commanders work for the brigade commander. Battalion commanders assigned to camps work for their respective camp commanders. Company commanders work for their battalion commanders.

As EPW camps transition into EPW battalions, the battalion commanders work for the brigade commander. The guard company commanders work for their battalion commanders as do any escort guard company commanders supporting the battalion. When escort guard company platoons are attached to other EPW battalions, they work

#### **THE MP CONFINEMENT BATTALION**

The MP confinement battalion is responsible for confinement operations for the PERSCOM. It provides the theater with

for the battalion commander to which they are attached.

The MP PW brigade provides general support to the theater of operations. It performs its EPW mission for all US forces operating within the theater.

#### **EMPLOYMENT**

Units of the MP PW brigade are positioned most often in the rear of the COMMZ. They are usually located near HN CS and CSS facilities. Placed near sea, air, and rail terminals, they receive, process, and intern EPWs. If evacuation to CONUS is required, escort guard companies move EPWs to the aerial point of embarkation. Escort guard companies assigned to the CONUS EPW command are responsible for the movement of EPWs from that point to their final destination in the US.

MP from the PW brigade go forward to the corps holding area to take custody of EPWs. These MP may go forward to division collecting points, if distances and resources permit, to evacuate EPWs from these locations. (EPWs of high intelligence value may be briefly held at division and corps headquarters for interrogation by intelligence personnel.) Using backhaul transportation, MP ensure EPWs are quickly evacuated to camps or EPW battalions in the COMMZ. Walking wounded EPWs are evacuated by this same means along with other EPWs. EPWs who are litter patients are evacuated through medical channels. (Medical personnel often request MP to guard hospitalized EPWs not realizing that this is not an MP mission [see *FM 19-40*] or that force structure planning does not provide for MP performance of this mission.) Echelon commanders can assign this mission to any unit. The impact of having MP perform this mission, in almost all instances, causes trade-offs in missions for which MP are responsible.

trained confinement personnel. The confinement battalion has a maximum capacity of only 1,500 prisoners. Generally, only one

confinement battalion is assigned. But the actual number will depend on the number of US prisoners requiring confinement within the theater.


Theater policy for confinement operations remains with the TA PM wherever confinement operations are established. In a mature theater, confinement operations remain within the PERSCOM only if additional confinement battalions are not required. The need for additional battalions generally results in confinement operations being assigned to the TAACOM MP brigades. In that case the confinement work load is distributed between each TAACOM MP brigade by assigning confinement battalions as necessary.

When possible, persons awaiting trial are detained in their units. Only when they present a hazard to the mission, themselves, or others are they placed in pretrial confinement at a detention or confinement facility under the control of MP. While MP companies within the division and corps have the expertise to operate a field detention

facility for limited periods of time, they have neither the resources nor the capability to operate one on an extended basis. Thus all confinement is consolidated in the PERSCOM whenever possible. If commanders find that sending soldiers pending courts-martial to the rear has an adverse effect on those fighting the battle, they may choose to establish confinement facilities within the division or corps. MP cellular confinement teams can be assigned to perform this mission when required. Otherwise, confinement at these locations is normally performed by unit personnel.

### ORGANIZATION

The confinement battalion is organized as an HHC with battalion and company headquarters sections as well as various staff sections needed to support the confinement operation. The battalion provides command and control of up to 1,500 US military prisoners. The battalion has some of the modular structure of the EPW battalion. It requires a guard company to support each 500 prisoners.



## **COMMAND AND CONTROL, STAFF, AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

The MP confinement battalion commander commands the battalion and works for the PERSCOM commander. He advises the PERSCOM commander on all matters pertaining to confinement procedures. The guard companies assigned to the battalion work for the battalion commander.

When a PERSCOM has not been assigned to the theater, the confinement battalion is assigned to the TAACOM MP brigade. This arrangement places an additional mission on the TAACOM MP brigade commander without any additional command and control capability as is done when EPW organizations are placed under his command and

control. As a result, the S3 and long-range plans section of the TAACOM MP brigade must often task organize to ensure that confinement operations are being properly supported.

## **EMPLOYMENT**

Assets of the MP confinement battalion are employed to detain, sustain, and protect US military prisoners. The confinement battalion is generally located in the rear of the COMMZ near logistic and transportation support. This allows convicted prisoners to be moved as quickly as possible from the corps area to the COMMZ confinement facility. Movement of US prisoners from the COMMZ to CONUS will be in accordance with Department of the Army (DA) policy.

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**Military Police Support to the Transportation Command,  
the Petroleum Group, the Ordnance Group,  
and the Special Ammunition Ordnance Brigade**

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**MP support to the TRANSCOM, and to the TA's petroleum group, ordnance group, and special ammunition ordnance brigade is provided by special-purpose MP companies.** They provide dedicated security for the critical facilities and supplies operated or controlled by their supported unit. MP security companies support the TRANSCOM and the petroleum and ordnance groups. MP heavy security companies support the special ammunition ordnance brigade.

The TRANSCOM's terminal battalions control loading and storage of cargoes and supplies. The TA's petroleum group operates the theater's bulk petroleum distribution system, which extends from the rear edge of the COMMZ forward into the combat zone. The TA's special ammunition ordnance brigade stores, supplies, maintains, and controls the theater's nuclear ammunition. And the TA's ordnance group provides those same services for the theater's conventional ammunition. *For discussion of the services of the TRANSCOM, the petroleum group, the ordnance group, and the special ammunition ordnance brigade, see FM 55-10, FM 10-67, FM 9-6, and FM 9-84.*

Most special-purpose MP companies operate only in a maturing theater. They are organic to the TA's functional commands and units. They arrive in theater with their supported TA unit. These MP security companies include those organic to TRANSCOM terminal battalions to prevent pilferage and intentional mishandling of cargo. Included also are those assigned to the petroleum group to deny sabotage and pilferage attempts. And others are those assigned, when needed, to ordnance battalions to provide security at ASPS.

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But some special-purpose MP companies are organic to units having sensitive security needs on a routine basis. MP heavy security companies are assigned to the special ammunition ordnance brigade to furnish security of special ammunition. Because of the sensitive nature of special ammunition, these MP companies provide security of this commodity in peacetime environments as well as in theaters of operation. Thus these MP units may be present in a developing as well as in a maturing theater. In wartime they provide dedicated security to the ammunition during its wartime storage at locations in the COMMZ and during its movement to other locations for wartime resupply.




When the territory of a TA coincides with that of an HN, security of most critical facilities is provided by the HN. However, the HN might need and request US assistance. As the theater matures, the MP security companies arriving with TA units can help provide that assistance. If help were needed to provide security for critical pumping stations and transfer points, the need would be met by MP assigned to the petroleum group. If security of port, water-

way, and railway facilities in areas under US control could not be provided by the HN, MP assigned to the TRANSCOM could provide security for them. And security companies could be assigned to the TA's ordnance group to provide security of conventional ammunition. In a developing theater, however, where TAACOM MP assets may have to carry out some of these security responsibilities until TA units arrive, they would be done in accord with the TAACOM commander's priority of need for MP employment.

## ORGANIZATION OF MP SECURITY COMPANIES

The organization of special-purpose MP companies providing security is set by TOE. The companies are similar in that each kind of security company has a headquarters,

food service, maintenance, and supply section. And if security needs dictate, each company can be augmented by a patrol dog section.



However, the heavy security company and the security company differ in the number and size of the platoons and squads. The heavy security company is larger than its companion security company. The heavy security company has four platoons, each

having four 10-man squads. The security company has three platoons, each having three 12-man squads. The squads are uniform in size within each company. This allows squads to be tasked interchangeably to accomplish the company's security mission.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL AND SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

The command and control and support relationships are alike in both types of secu-

rity companies. The command and control extends downward from the commander of

the unit to which it is assigned. The MP company commander works for the commander of the supported unit. He advises the commander on matters pertaining to security. He commands the MP company and ensures his company accomplishes its mis-

sion. Each platoon leader directs and supervises his platoon's execution of its mission.

MP security companies provide general support for the units to which they are assigned.

## **EMPLOYMENT OF MP HEAVY SECURITY COMPANIES**

The security of special ammunition is provided by MP heavy security companies from its point of entry into the theater and during its movement to and storage in the weapons holding area. Heavy security companies also secure special ammunition during its subsequent movement to and storage at the corps NASPs and any movement forward to the user units in the division area and/or to division ammunition transfer points. Heavy security companies provide "security in depth." Early warning is provided by the establishment of OPs, LPs, sensors, MWDs, and both mounted and dismounted security

patrols. The security-in-depth concept is further developed by the establishment of a defensive perimeter. This perimeter consists of continuously manned fighting positions camouflaged to avoid detection and planned with overlapping fields of fire. If the supported unit routinely relocates, the MP can also expect to provide assets for quartering parties. These MP would provide route and area recon in transit. On arrival they would provide security for new NASP locations. They would also provide security during weapons transfers and perform as a reaction force when needed.


## **EMPLOYMENT OF MP SECURITY COMPANIES**

Because of the differences in security needs of the TA units an MP security company can support, there is no standard employment for an MP security company. The MP commander employs assets based on his mission orders. He receives his orders from the commander of the supported unit. He distributes assets and employs control measures based on the needs of the supported unit. He also considers METT-T and the type and size of the facility being secured or the geographical area over which it extends.

An MP security company commander can expect to locate his company headquarters near the headquarters of the supported unit. He can expect to locate each platoon headquarters where it can best direct the accomplishment of the mission. He can expect to employ his assets for perimeter defense and local security. MP security companies performing pipeline, port and harbor, or railway security can expect to share conventional security responsibilities with HN forces and other US forces.

**AN EXAMPLE OF MP SECURITY COMPANIES AND  
HEAVY SECURITY COMPANIES SUPPORTING TA FUNCTIONAL UNITS  
IS SHOWN ON THE FOLLOWING PAGE**

# MP UNITS SUPPORTING THE TRANSCOM, THE PETROLEUM GROUP, THE ORDNANCE GROUP, AND THE SPECIAL AMMUNITION ORDNANCE BRIGADE



## Military Police Support for Low-Intensity Conflicts

**In a world dominated by fear of destructive might, low-intensity conflict (LIC) may become, of necessity, the instrument of choice of countries or groups intending to pressure their aims by using force.** Low-intensity conflict is not solely of interest to the terrorist, the insurgent, or the guerrilla. Threat governments and their surrogates have an understanding and interest in the use of LIC as a benefit to strategic plans.

LIC may well be a level of conflict experienced frequently in the future. If so, the specific operation assigned will determine what type of US Army force will be required.

A LIC operation is nominally characterized as a peacetime contingency operation (PCO), a foreign internal defense (FID) operation, or a peacekeeping (PK) operation. Although LIC operations are discussed as separate "categories," there are occasions when they overlap or occur simultaneously. The separation between these categories is often blurred. An operation may begin as a contingency rescue operation. After initial resistance is quelled, it may become a PK operation. Then, when the initial forces depart, MP and support units may be tasked to remain for a FID operation.

As terrorism occurs as part of all three LIC categories, US forces must be prepared to conduct terrorism counteraction measures in any LIC operation. In LIC environments belligerents often use terrorism to accomplish their goals. Terrorism is commonly used to cause governments to overextend their forces. Involvement in internal defense reduces their offensive capabilities. Terrorism is used as an effective form of psychological warfare. It gains attention and recognition of a nation's political, social, or economic problems. Terrorism is also often

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used to provoke police or military forces into overreacting so they lose the respect of the people.

Whatever form LIC takes, MP can assist HN /US efforts to thwart terrorism. MP can advise and help develop terrorism counteraction programs. MP can help prevent or reduce the effects of the terrorists by providing personnel, equipment, and training to deter and defeat terrorism. MP may assist in protective services details to protect key personnel. On occasion MP may be called upon to function as a response force to a terrorist incident. *See FM 100-37, FM 19-10, and TC 19-16 for details on MP responsibility, response operations, organization, and command and control in terrorist incidents.*

## PEACETIME CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

A PCO is a politically sensitive military operation. It is usually a rapid deployment of forces for short-term operations in conditions short of conventional war. Usually it is without a preestablished US support base. It may be with or without allied assistance. In contingency combined operations, US forces deploy with allies.

A PCO is sometimes deemed necessary if diplomacy has failed to achieve a high-value and time-sensitive objective like protecting a nation's interests and/or assets. types of PCOs include—

- Strikes or raids to eliminate strategic targets, terrorist training bases or staging areas, and the like.
- Rescues and recoveries to aid personnel and protect property.
- Shows of force to influence friendly and enemy attitudes and commitments.
- Intelligence and information gathering operations to obtain IPB data before deployment of an armed force in a PCO.

Most often the US takes part in a PCO at the request of an HN. The objectives of the HN, in coordination with those of the US, determine the nature and extent of a military operation. US forces may be there to effect a decisive change in the conflict or to preserve US interests. Often they are there to provide HN forces with time and space to regain the initiative and enhance their control of the tactical situation. Time and space operations are primarily tactical operations against insurgent or guerrilla forces. The operations are offensive-oriented. They are intended to deny the insurgents or guerrillas the ability to train, sustain, and protect their forces. PCOs are expected to be of limited duration.

Peacetime contingency operations are usually carried out by a joint task force. The size of the force, its mission, and its AO vary with each employment. The Army component may be a small specialized element or a

battalion or brigade task force. Or it may range up to a division- or corps-size force tailored to the operation. If operational objectives are not achieved within a limited time, the operation may transform into a mid-intensity or higher level tactical operation.


PCOs are usually carried out by light forces like airborne, air assault, or light infantry divisions. These contingency forces generally introduce combat and CS elements into an objective area in three phases. **The three phases of a contingency operation are—**

- ① **Deployment.**
- ② **Lodgement.**
- ③ **Expansion of logistical base and buildup of forces.**

The MP company assigned to the committed division provides MP support for the PCO. For example, if elements of a light division conduct a contingency operation, MP will accompany the assault force into the lodgement area. **During the first phase**, the MP advance party consists of a minimum of a PM cell and an MP platoon. The MP platoon's immediate missions may include the security of designated critical assets or terrain, safeguarding any US nationals, and/or securing captured EPWs/CIs. Elements from the MP advance party initially secure the division's ASPs. MP obtain a detailed knowledge of the road network in the vicinity of the arriving forces.

**During the second phase** of operation, the follow-on divisional elements arrive. They reinforce the assault forces and expand security out to the range of organic indirect-fire weapons. With them come the remaining platoons of the division MP company. These platoons will assist MP already in the lodgement area by providing BCC to and from the lodgement area and area security within the division's AO. They may be tasked to evacuate EPWs/CIs to the division EPW collecting point.

## MP SUPPORTING THE ASSAULT FORCE




If the contingency force introduces corps units into the contingency area, elements of the corps MP brigade will secure the corps headquarters. They can also operate a corps EPW holding area if one is required. If MP platoons from the corps augment the division, they come under the OPCON of the division PM. These platoons can reinforce division MP platoons or provide support to the maneuver brigades.

During the third phase, the lodgement area is expanded to continue supporting the forward brigades. MP begin providing the full range of MP support for divisional

operations. They stress BCC and area security. In this phase, brigade, division, and corps rear areas are defined.

During this phase, any further augmentation by the contingency corps arrives. Corps MP brigade assets provide limited BCC and area security within the corps rear area. They go forward to the division EPW collecting points to evacuate EPWs/CIs to the corps holding area. If EPWs/CIs are to be moved from the Contingency area, an out-of-theater EPW camp may be set up to briefly hold EPWs/CIs pending their disposition.

## MP SUPPORTING THE EXPANSION OF THE LODGEMENT AREA




Expected variations occur in the employment of contingency forces. A contingency operation mounted where the Army does not have deployed forces must conduct military operations where no previous US force exists. The availability of HN support initially will be limited due to the lack of agreements or the undeveloped nature of many potential AOs. If a contingency operation is initiated in a hostile environment, the first support elements are deployed as soon as initial objectives have been seized and a lodgement area has been secured by combat forces. Deployment to such an area may entail airborne, airmobile, or amphibious seizure of the lodgement area. The concept of contingency operations dictates a task force able to operate efficiently in this unique, highly vulnerable environment. MP supporting such contingency forces concentrate on area security and EPW operations. Then, as more forces arrive and the AO expands, BCC gains importance.

But when US forces enter into a threatening but not active combat situation, the support elements may precede the combat elements. This allows the needed units, materials, and other support to be on hand

and ready. Upon arrival in such a contingency area, the PM coordinates with the staff officers of the major unit. He ensures that his prepared plans are based on the current situation. He reviews the establishment of guidelines and procedures with the SJA for the conduct of MP activities involving civilians and any HN laws that must be followed. MP representatives contact HN authorities for information that will aid US forces in conducting BCC and area security missions. If needed, MP may conduct combined operations with the HN in terrorism counteraction to maintain or restore HN control. The probability of terrorism and other acts of sabotage and subversion are high during a PCO. Terrorism may be used to support insurgency objectives or tactical operations of guerrilla forces.

In addition, the PM reviews plans for handling EPWs /CIs. He ensures that all responsible units are ready to support the handling and internment of EPWs /CIs. He meets with the HN police authority when one is available and assesses the abilities of local national police forces. He ensures that MP obtain the information on routes, important facilities and the population that they need to support MP missions.



The MP battlefield missions are conducted in contingency operations in generally the same manner as they are in the conventional battlefield environment. Conventional prisoner of war guidance and doctrine may be applicable to the handling of captured personnel in LIC. In accord with a 1949 Geneva convention, captured guerrillas who meet the criteria for and are accorded combatant status are accorded prisoner of war status.

In a contingency operation, EPWs will be under the control and supervision of the senior Army command PM located in the area. An essential and vital prerequisite for prisoner record keeping, accountability, and reporting is the establishment of prisoner processing teams. If a processing section is required, on-site contingency MP forces are

organized into an EPW processing section of seven different ad hoc teams. The section includes search, receiving, property, processing, fingerprinting and photography (if equipment is available), and records teams. In addition, MWD teams can be used for prisoner security. If MWD teams do not accompany the deploying MP forces, they can be requested from supporting out-of-theater assets. Responsibility for EPW/CI security, administration, and further evacuation usually is assumed by the MP brigade.

When it is in accord with a US-HN agreement, enemy in the custody of the US forces may be transferred to the HN for internment. But US responsibility for the prisoners' welfare and accountability continues until they are released, repatriated, or returned to US custody.

## **FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE OPERATIONS**

A FID operation is undertaken to help improve the capabilities and efficiency of an HN's authorities. Sometimes known as a counterinsurgency operation, a FID operation is conducted to help an HN counter guerrilla and insurgent operations. A FID operation provides equipment, trainers, and advisors for "security assistance" elements. Sometimes it also provides technical and tactical military backup forces. But US policy places emphasis on HNs providing the assets needed for their own defense.

MP support may be to an HN's military, paramilitary, or civil forces in FID operations. But under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 the US military can only advise or train a foreign government's police force if such assistance is approved by Congress in an amendment to that act. Most often MP advise an HN's military or its paramilitary forces. Sometimes the MP participate in combined operations with the host government. In any case MP can expect to provide technical, advisory, and training support. They also can provide police-related equipment support.

An MP force providing security assistance for FID is often a cellular team. Or it may be an ad hoc team tailored to the operation. An MP team can provide MP planning, advice, and assistance to HN or deployed US forces. The teams often consist of a detachment headquarters team and one or more functional advisory teams. The advisory teams may include expertise in civil disturbance and area control. They may provide expertise in police public relations, physical security, and general investigative/police subjects. They include language expertise (interpreters). Continuous coordination and liaison between US and HN forces are provided by these teams.

MP may also support a FID operation as an element of a US tactical backup force. For example, MP may accompany a light infantry brigade responding as a backup force. Backup forces range from company-size units to battalion- and brigade-level task forces. Backup forces are committed to operational areas when the abilities of security assistance elements have been exceeded. A backup force is sometimes placed in advisory and training roles for limited periods.



Sometimes MP support US tactical forces called on to counter a large insurgent group or guerrilla force. Tactical operations may occur at the same time FID operations are being conducted. But such US forces are used only when or where they have a high probability of decisively altering a situation. The manner in which MP are employed for these operations is situation-dependent. See *FM 90-8 for details on counterinsurgency operations.*

### **INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS**

Success in a FID operation greatly depends on having timely intelligence and information. The nature of FID operations dictates a need for immediate access to detailed information. This includes economic, political, cultural, geographic, and police data. Police data will contain information on terrorist organizations and guerrilla activities, as they often overlap with criminal activities.

Combined police information operations can complement the overall intelligence and counterintelligence program. However, the degree to which the US and HN authorities integrate their intelligence effort is situation-dependent. Whenever possible, MP use the information assets and abilities of local HN authorities. HN police are close to the centers of unrest and are generally more acceptable to the population than are HN or US military forces.

Close coordination and continuous contact in combined police operations are critical in intelligence efforts. MP liaison elements may be assigned to HN police stations or coordination centers. They can assist in coordinating combined operations and help ensure a continuous flow of information. Police information efforts are closely coordinated through the PM section to the G2/S2, G3/S3, and G5/S5. See *FM 34-1 for detailed guidance on intelligence operations.*

### **POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL OPERATIONS**

Populace and resources control (PRC)

operations are designed to detect and neutralize insurgent or guerrilla activities. PRC operations are mainly carried out by some form of HN police. Sometimes US forces are called on to conduct PRC operations until HN forces are available to relieve them. PRC often occurs in concert with civil affairs (CA) operations. PRC and CA operations both help provide a secure physical and psychological environment for the population. Together the operations can restrict the movement of insurgents or guerrillas. They can sever access to support materials provided by sympathizers to the insurgent/guerrilla forces. Deprived of resources, the guerrillas must either become overt or retreat into rougher terrain to forage for food and supplies. In either case the belligerents become more vulnerable to police or military action.

MP provide a distinct advantage in FID PRC. PRC operations are similar to elements of the MP BCC and area security missions. To support PRC programs MP can conduct route recon and surveillance. They can provide convoy security for priority or sensitive supplies. They can effect the refugee control that is vital to PRC success. MP can also provide security of critical assets. Warehouses and radio stations, for example, must not be permitted to fall into insurgents' hands. And MP can provide protective services to key personnel.

Population surveillance may be needed to help suppress insurgent or guerrilla activities. MP can provide area reconnaissance and surveillance throughout a given AO. MP can help prevent infiltration of insurgents and their supplies across borders. MP can support border operations at control posts and crossing points. MP can perform customs and refugee control. They can enforce movement and travel restrictions. MP also can monitor borders with mobile patrols. Or they may operate checkpoint and roadblocks. MP can help ensure entering or departing personnel are not moving contraband. MP using MWD teams can help detect explosives or narcotics. And

MP can help HN authorities investigate crimes suspected of being committed to support insurgent activities and guerrilla operations. If a crime is severe, USACIDC personnel may be requested to assist. *See FM 19-10 for details.*

MP can support an HN in combined cordon-and-search operations. MP can cordon off the area for HN search parties. They can protect captured persons or property. And they can evacuate prisoners. A search may be oriented to people, to material, to buildings, or to terrain. The actual search is performed by HN police when they are available in adequate numbers and have been trained in search operations. The proper use of authority in searches gains the respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or inconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress the guerrilla force or expose elements of it. But, at the same time, such methods may ultimately increase the civilian population's sympathy for and/or support of the guerrillas. MWDs used to detect explosives and narcotics are an invaluable asset in search operations. Their abilities as trackers and searchers warrant maximum use.

MP can support HN forces in securing urban areas. HN forces handle and quell any incidents of insurgent unrest or guerrilla attacks within the area. MP may take part in combined civil disturbance operations. However, MP participation is limited to containing the disturbance and protecting US lives and property. The suppression of demonstrators and rioters should be left entirely to HN forces. Any direct action by US troops against demonstrators or rioters might be

claimed by the insurgents and their sympathizers as "brutal suppression of legitimate dissent" and used for propaganda purposes. *See FM 19-15 for details on civil disturbance operations.* MP will usually provide cordon security around the urban area, thereby denying the belligerents support or reinforcements. Critical facilities like public utilities, police stations, and governmental FID coordination centers are crucial to FID operations. MP may act as a rapid response force to protect these assets.

### **CIVIL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS**

MP will often be used in CA operations. Close coordination with the G5/S5 and liaison with appropriate HN representatives has added emphasis in FID. The scope of CA operations is influenced by the economic, social, psychological, and political background of the country and people. CA personnel will coordinate the efforts of the MP to restore stability, contribute to national development, and promote support for the host government. CA assists in preventing civilian interference with military operations and coordinates all other military-civil affairs, such as community relations, PRC, civil defense, and community/area security programs.

MP can conduct ADC measures to assist the HN in the aftermath of an insurgent activity or guerrilla attack. This assistance may include handling refugees, evacuees, and stragglers. MP can provide humanitarian assistance. They can help rescue and evacuate injured for medical care. They may also help issue food, water, and essential supplies. *See FM 41-10 for details on CA operations.*

### **PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

A PK operation is a low-intensity military operation undertaken to restore or maintain peace. A PK operation often contains ambiguous situations in which the PK force must attempt to defuse extreme tension and violence. This violence may range from terrorism and sabotage to minor military

conflicts involving known and unknown belligerents. The essence of PK is the diffusing of hostilities and the monitoring and reporting of incidents that violate the terms of a peace accord. MP forces may serve as an element of a United Nations PK force or as part of a multinational observer group. MP


are well-suited to PK operations. *They are uniquely trained for maintaining order and for de-escalating violence*

PK operations are undertaken by "neutral" forces to ensure that renewed active hostility does not occur while adversaries are attempting to negotiate a state of peace.

A PK force maintains surveillance over a designated area. It observes activities


occurring within those areas and reports its findings, And, if necessary, it oversees corrections of any violations to a peace accord.

The terms of a cease-fire agreement may call for the PK force to supervise the withdrawals and disengagements of the belligerents. Or it may call for the PK force to monitor demobilization of forces in a



given area. MP participating in PK operations can observe and report on compliance with diplomatically arranged cease-fires. A PK force must be able to respond rapidly within its AOs to investigate possible violations.

The overall operational control of a military PK force is exercised by a multinational staffed military PK command. The



military PK command exercises operational control of the multinational force. But commanders of each of the assigned national forces retain command integrity of their units. A military area command, which consists of forces from any single nation, reports to the military PK command. The military area command retains its usual command and control with its subelements.

Basic MP force structure and appropriate augmentation are situation-dependent. The size and composition of the MP force is determined by diplomatic negotiations. Personnel spaces are allocated based on the US contingents' respective missions. The principle of consent affects the composition and function of the PK force. Consent applies to the degree of interest the disputing countries have when contributing their forces to participate in the PK force effort.

Each PK operation is unique, but is generally characterized by constraints in the use of force. In PK operations, force is to be used only for self-defense. Thus, the soldiers in a PK operation must possess the skills required for warfare. But, they must also be trained so that they are equally able to act as intermediaries.

MP are a distinct asset in a PK operation. They are experienced in a case-by-case approach to the use of force. They are experienced in the use of discretion and in the de-escalation of potential violence. And MP experienced in EPW operations are especially useful in handling EPWs if the PK force supervises the exchange of prisoners of war. In addition, situations may arise that require US military PK forces to provide limited support to HN law enforcement authorities. MP are especially qualified to render support in this area.

Terrorism can be an element of any PK operation. It may be employed with other military and/or political activities designed to supplant the existing peace accords, treaty. In a PK operation, MP will be tasked to observe for and deter all terrorist acts. MP can ensure that the interests of involved

disputing countries are maintained through the aggressive use of OPs/LPs, patrolling, investigation of possible terrorist acts, and information gathering. The manning of

checkpoints on designated critical roads, especially into and out of urban areas, will assist in controlling contraband, terrorism, and potential trouble spots.

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## US Army Criminal Investigation Command Support on the Battlefield

**The US Army Criminal Investigation Command is the Army's sole agent responsible for investigating felony crimes on or off the battlefield. USACIDC provides investigative support to commanders at every echelon.**

USACIDC personnel investigate offenses committed—

- Against US forces.
- Against US property.
- By military personnel.
- By civilians serving with US forces.

They investigate violations of international agreements on land warfare. They provide forensic science support to other USACIDC units in the theater of operations. And, at the direction of the commanding general (CG) of USACIDC or higher authority, they conduct special investigations.

Major USACIDC operations on the AirLand battlefield are the support of logistics security (LOGSEC) operations, the management of criminal and terrorist-related intelligence, and the conduct of criminal investigations. USACIDC conducts LOGSEC operations to prevent, detect, and investigate criminal actions. These actions may be undertaken by enemy or terrorist elements, HN, allied, or even US personnel. Their aim may be to divert or destroy supplies or to substitute products. USACIDC collects, analyzes, and disseminates criminal and terrorist-related intelligence aimed at US and allied interests and activities. USACIDC also provides battlefield investigative support to each echelon of command. USA CIDC's special agents investigate serious crimes. Such crime adversely affects morale and discipline.

USACIDC operations help the commander maintain discipline and order by preventing

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or investigating crimes that reduce a unit's ability to fight. Priority is given to helping keep the command's critical supplies from being diverted, Priority is also given to restricting the introduction of drugs into US units.

USACIDC operations undertaken at a given time are determined by the echelon commander's need, the intensity of the conflict, and the availability of USACIDC resources.

The scope of USACIDC operations varies based on the following factors:

- **The Threat.**
- **Land mass.**
- **Density of supplies.**
- **Transportation volume.**
- **Troop population.**
- **HN law and order requirements.**
- **Initial phases of the property disposal process.**

Investigative requirements for ports, major resupply points, and laboratory facilities routinely increase with the maturity of the battlefield. As combat operations stabilize and the theater becomes more secure, the level of sophistication employed by the criminal element may increase. When this occurs, USACIDC agents must make use of advanced investigative skills and laboratory technology.

Like other MP units, USACIDC elements are located throughout the theater of operations. They provide support to US forces operating in a given geographical area. Unlike other MP units, USACIDC elements are not assigned to echelons in the theater of operations. They are part of a centralized command that reports directly to the CG of USACIDC.

### ORGANIZATION OF USACIDC UNITS


The organization of USACIDC units in a theater of operations is set by TOE. Each theater of operations is supported by a criminal investigation laboratory and a varying number of US ACIDC support elements. As the number of ASGs increases, so does the need for USACIDC elements. The major USACIDC unit in a theater of operations is USACIDC region headquarters. All USACIDC elements in a theater are assigned to this headquarters.

USACIDC support in the COMMZ is provided by theater support elements (TSEs). Their subordinate units are theater area support elements (TASEs). One TSE supports

ports each TAACOM. One TASE supports each TAACOM ASG .

Each ASG that contains port operations within its area of responsibility will, ideally, be supported by a port area support element (PASE). The PASE provides additional manpower and expertise for port security and for preventing supply diversion, The PASE reports directly to the TSE.

USACIDC support in the forward combat zone is provided by a corps support element (CSE). Its subordinate units are corps area support elements (CASEs) and division support elements (DSEs). Two (CASEs support each corps. One DSE supports each division.



For contingencies, the USACIDC region may task-organize available resources to cover prioritized operations. Reallocation of

resources by USACIDC between or within theaters is likely.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL**

The focal point for command and control of USACIDC operations in theater is at the echelons-above-corps (EAC). The USACIDC command element is collocated with the senior Army headquarters in the theater. It exercises overall management of all USACIDC investigative elements in the theater.

Control is maintained through a vertical command structure and reporting system. USACIDC units in the combat zone are under the command and control of the CSE headquarters. In the COMMZ they are under the command and control of the TSE headquarters. These headquarters are under the command and control of USACIDC region headquarters. USACIDC region headquarters works directly for the CG of USACIDC.

But USACIDC units are small. And they are often widely dispersed across the battle-

field. If the tactical situation precludes effective centralized command and control, USACIDC units may be attached briefly to the supported command. Attachments require the concurrence of the next higher USACIDC headquarters. The commander receiving the attachment gains command authority, except for promotion, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and reassignment authority, which are retained by the CG, USACIDC. Units receiving USACIDC support, regardless of type, provide the USACIDC element with administrative and logistical support not organically available to the USACIDC element. USACIDC units are usually attached for this support to the headquarters of the MP unit with which they collocate.

## **STAFF RELATIONSHIPS**

Although there is no formal staff relationship, USACIDC commanders advise their supported commanders on criminal investigation matters. Investigative elements at all echelons interact with the echelon com-

mander and his staff. They coordinate with police, intelligence, and inspector general staffs. This enhances the quality and reliability of intelligence information without duplication of effort.

## **SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS**

Usually, USACIDC elements provide general support within their supported command's AOs. Sometimes USACIDC units provide direct support. The selection of

the most appropriate method of support is coordinated between the appropriate USACIDC headquarters and the headquarters planning the operation.

## **EMPLOYMENT**

When they can be, USACIDC units are collocated with MP units. This provides unified law enforcement support on the battlefield. In the COMMZ, the TSE collocates with MP brigade headquarters. Each TASE collocates with an MP battalion headquarters. In a corps, the CSE collocates with the MP brigade headquarters. Each CASE collocates with

an MP battalion headquarters. In a division, each USACIDC detachment collocates with a division PM cell.

USACIDC elements maintain active coordination with other elements of the supported command. USACIDC elements coordinate on a day-to-day basis with intelligence and PM activities. They coordinate



often with HN and allied law enforcement agencies, usually at the civil-military integration center.

Criminal and terrorist activities are directed primarily against the local commander's logistical capability, which is essential for maintaining momentum on the battlefield. LOGSEC maintains the integrity of the logistics flow from the manufacturer to each combat soldier. LOGSEC operations identify and assess logistical security weaknesses. Then the commander can be provided a list of actions, prioritized to reduce the vulnerability and further degradation of the logistics pipeline. When possible, actions may be recommended to recover logistical losses.

By conducting criminal and terrorist-related intelligence operations, investigators help develop appropriate countermeasures to identified threats. Criminal intelligence collection augments military intelligence with crime data. The consolidation of this criminal and military intelligence provides comprehensive intelligence data. Investigators collect and process terrorist-related and other criminal intelligence. They provide its timely dissemination to counterpart MP, MI, and AFOSI units and to supported commanders, RAOCs, and HN criminal intelligence networks. Investigators provide technical assistance in developing terrorism counteraction plans and antiterrorist programs. They also provide hostage negotiation support.

USACIDC elements stationed throughout the theater provide criminal investigative support. Investigators conduct investigations of war crimes and other serious crimes. They protect designated key personnel. They conduct operations to prevent the introduction of drugs or illegal substances to US units. And they provide investigative support to US commanders of EPW camps. USACIDC units perform other law enforcement activities as requested by the supported command or as directed by the CG, USACIDC. USACIDC elements also provide specialized technical services, such as polygraph and laboratory analysis.

The USACIDC helps identify and verify the abilities and intent of the criminal and terrorist threats. USACIDC also helps the supported command eliminate Threat activities or minimize their effects. Criminal investigative operations detect and deter criminal and Threat activities. They enhance security of the logistical system on the Air-Land battlefield. They ensure criminals are apprehended and prosecuted, even in a battlefield environment.

Felony crimes can be reported directly to local USACIDC units. However, they are usually reported to an MP unit, which then refers the case to USACIDC for investigation. Personnel in USACIDC units and MP units must maintain a close working relationship. This relationship ensures good results in investigations and the apprehension of offenders. It also helps in acquiring and transmitting criminal information and preventing criminal activity.

## Host Nation Support

**In theaters in which the Army has forward-deployed forces, allied military and civil authorities are a source of considerable potential support and assistance.** Allied support and HN support (HNS) are based on two different sources. Allied support is based on multinational alliance treaties like that of NATO. In general, alliances provide support for and between military units of the nations concluding a treaty. HNS is based on bilateral nation-to-nation agreements like the US-German Host Nation Support Agreement. HNS includes support from civilian resources as well as military resources. The available level of support that can be expected by US forces is established during negotiations of the treaties or the agreements.

### KINDS OF HOST NATION SUPPORT

HNS from civilian resources can provide US forces with supplies and equipment that may be more readily acquired locally than through the US support system. Host nationals are familiar with local customs, facilities, equipment, and other resources. Thus, HN personnel are likely to be more able to provide some forms of support than US personnel. This support may range from agricultural and dairy products to locally crafted products and locally produced repair parts.

HNS to US forces from military resources can include the efforts of transportation units, decontamination units, casualty evacuation, and security and other units. These HN units may be organized into HNS commands to act as central coordinators for HNS requirements and assignments. In some cases, an HN may develop units specifically designed to support US forces. For example, these HN units may provide traffic control and convoy escort. Or HN guard companies may provide installation security. Truck companies may be used for cargo and troop transportation. And repair units may provide maintenance support.

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The TA commander determines the functional types of support needed. And in coordination with Headquarters, DA, he determines the level of support that can be accepted without risking US unilateral capability. The scope of such support is limited only by the availability of resources and by the ability to reach an agreement concerning its use.

To be effective, HNS must be planned and coordinated well in advance. There must be firm understandings and commitments. HNS is theater- and situation-dependent.

The form and degree of support that is available depends on resources of the geographical area and/or prior agreements.

Specific peacetime planning for wartime HNS is essential. To accomplish this coordination, the TA provides liaison teams that may be collocated with HN territorial or gendarme forces or may be located at US headquarters. Liaison teams support all US forces within the boundaries of the HN

headquarters with whom they work. They coordinate all aspects of wartime HNS. This includes support from civilian resources and support from military resources. US civil affairs staff elements provide interface with civil authorities to coordinate and assist with HNS. These elements help acquire the use of HN resources like services, facilities, transportation, and labor. Coordination with HN government agencies that operate railways, highways, and waterway systems is invaluable.

## **HNS FOR MP RESPONSIBILITIES**

In some circumstances an HN's CS operations may directly impact on the priority of MP employment. This occurs when, by agreement, an HN retains responsibility for operations that would otherwise be assumed by US Army MP. These HN operations may include aspects of BCC, area security, EPW, and law and order operations. HN personnel are familiar with terrain, transportation, and communications networks. They are well able to perform CS missions on their local terrain. HNS is welcomed wherever functional types and levels of support can be accepted without risking overall mission accomplishment.

### **BATTLEFIELD CIRCULATION CONTROL**

HNS can expedite movement of combat resources. By agreement, HNs in some locales are responsible for highway traffic. An HN usually provides battlefield traffic control in the COMMZ. The HN ensures that MSRs are designated, open, and able to be used. US traffic management headquarters provides US requirements to the HN system and ensures coordination is complete. MP remain responsible for MSRs designated exclusively for US Army use.

When an HN has responsibility for controlling traffic in the COMMZ, the HN coordinates with the Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA). The TAMCA develops and administers transportation policy and functions under policies established by the joint transportation center.

### **AREA SECURITY**

Where agreements exist, an HN may have primary responsibility for security in a COMMZ lying within its national boundaries. If so, the HN may be responsible for NBC defense and ADC. (ADC includes engineer support, maintenance, and explosive ordnance disposal.) It may provide communications support. And the HN may gather and provide information and intelligence.

The availability and capability of HN forces for security operations will greatly influence a theater commander's decision to assign rear area security missions to US forces. The HN may provide security to selected LOC facilities used by US forces within the COMMZ. Such facilities include terminal transfer points at railways and ports and on inland waterways and terminals and pumping stations on pipelines. But most often the use of these facilities is shared. The HN is usually responsible for operating theater ports. US port requirements are coordinated by the US military traffic management command. The operation of waterways and railways is also often the responsibility of the HN. US requirements for use of these LOCS are coordinated by the TAMCA. MP provide security for wharfs, loading areas, warehouses, and other such facilities that are used only by the US. Security of pipeline systems is coordinated by the joint petroleum office. *See Chapter 9.*

If an HN is responsible for rear area security, an agreement may require the HN

to furnish TCFs. If so, MP operating in the AO of the HN TCF could be placed under the OPCON of the TCF during Level III attacks. When HN and allied forces provide rear area security or provide support to tactical forces, liaison must be provided. MP maybe a part of the TA liaison to contribute to allied requirements and priorities. They exchange information and intelligence on current and projected capabilities. They help coordinate allied and HN activities.

#### **EPW**

The US retains responsibility for the processing and retention of all US-captured

EPWs. Thus use of HN support for EPW operations is limited. However, in some cases, HNs do provide limited support to help guard EPWs.

#### **LAW AND ORDER**

The HN continues its police services to its civilian communities. In wartime the HN expands these services to include control of refugees and regulation of civilian transportation. Whenever possible, MP provide liaison to allied and HN police as well as to other HN government and US military units. But only the US MP provide law enforcement support for US forces.

## Special Considerations

**The fluidity of an AirLand Battle will require tactical forces to move throughout the width and depth of the battlefield faster and more frequently than in the past.**

MP support to operations like passages of lines and river crossings will help ensure tactical forces can relocate quickly.

MP support to passage of lines and river crossings may require special considerations. Sometimes these operations involve a number of different command elements. If so, MP support must be coordinated with the commanders of all forces supporting the operation as well as with the commander of the supported force. Sometimes they require temporary changes in the command and control of MP elements supporting the operation.

Special considerations in MP employment are dictated by the type of operation being

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supported. They are also dictated by the amount and type of MP support required. And they are influenced by the battlefield situation where the operation is to take place.

### MP SUPPORT FOR PASSAGE OF LINES

In an AirLand Battle, a passage of lines may be marked by great confusion, fast-paced activity, and the possibility of enemy and friendly units being mixed together. At all times a passage of lines requires close coordination between the passing unit, the stationary units, and the MP providing support. MP ensure circulation control, evacuation of EPWs, straggler control, and refugee control. They also coordinate exchange of communications-electronics operation instructions information and adjustments in areas of responsibilities.

MP help reduce confusion and congestion during passages of lines. They provide security in areas surrounding passage points and passage lanes to ensure that passing units have priority for use of routes to and through the area. Route priority is set by the headquarters directing the operation.

MP can support a forward, rearward, or lateral passage of lines. MP in the AO have conducted area/zone reconnaissance and will be familiar with the routes to, through and beyond the area of passage. Thus, MP can extend the commander's command and control by providing directions at passage points. They also may guide units through passage lanes. Maintaining unit integrity and reducing incidents of stragglers is vital to maintaining the passing unit's momentum in a forward passage of lines. To prevent possible infiltration of the enemy, MP perform aggressive straggler and refugee control operations.

The passage of lines usually is planned and coordinated by the headquarters directing the passage. A division passage of lines usually is planned and coordinated by corps headquarters. The detailed plans are made

and coordinated between the divisions involved. Close coordination between the division's PMs and the corps PM is essential.

MP may themselves be the unit involved in passing through lines. When conducting a

delay of a Level III threat, MP are likely to conduct a passage of lines with a TCF. To avoid firing on friendly units, close coordination between the MP response force commander and the TCF is imperative.

## **MP SUPPORT FOR RIVER CROSSING**

On the AirLand battlefield, freedom to move in any direction is required for success. The US Army's ability to conduct river-crossing operations will significantly impact on the outcome of the battle. A river-crossing operation is undertaken to move a large force across a river obstacle with a minimum loss of momentum. MP play a vital role in the success of river-crossing operations. MP support assists that force in crossing the river as quickly and efficiently as possible.

MP support for river-crossing operations reduces crossing time and promotes efficient movement of vehicles. It reduces congestion, speeds the crossing, and enables the maneuver commander to continue his momentum toward his primary objective. In accordance with the traffic control plan, MP establish staging and holding areas and TCPs to control movement to and from these areas. And MP may be called upon to provide security for crossing forces at the crossing sites. MP are also positioned at engineer regulation points on both sides of the river, improving communications and coordination between units.

MP employment for river crossings is influenced by the battlefield situation where the crossing is to take place. The number and placement of MP assets supporting a river crossing vary with the size of the force crossing the river. They vary with the direction of the crossing (forward and retrograde). And they vary with the degree of enemy resistance expected or encountered.

River crossings occur most often in a division's AO where the battle's tempo and direction are most subject to change. To ease

control of large, fast-moving forces, the operation usually is apportioned one crossing area for each maneuver brigade. Each area is set by control lines on the left and right flanks, and begins and ends at the traffic regulation lines on the entrance and exit banks of the river. The lines are located along easily identifiable terrain features. Each crossing area has a crossing area commander, who has OPCON of all forces working within or passing through that crossing area. MP operating inside the crossing area are OPCON to the crossing area commander for the duration of the operation. MP operating outside the crossing area are under the command of their appropriate echelon commander.

The main thrust of MP support to river crossings is BCC within the river crossing AO. MP direct units to their proper location, such as holding and staging areas, and ensure units move through the area within the time listed on the movement schedule. This is a highly critical aspect of river crossings because the number of crossing sites is limited. MP assets are placed where they can stress BCC operations on MSRs leading into the crossing area as well as those inside the crossing area. MP also provide area security to allow the crossing force to cross the river without loss of momentum. MP are used to recon the crossing unit's flanks and rear. MP providing security for the division main CP will also provide in-transit security for the CP while displacing. All remaining MP assets are placed where they can best support the river crossing.

The division MP company provides support to the division assault forces on the entrance bank of the river, at the crossing

sites, and on the exit banks of the river. Due to the complex nature of a river crossing, the division MP company will require augmentation from a corps MP company. The corps MP company would be OPCON to the division PM and would be employed to best support the river crossing.

When planning to support a river-crossing operation, the division PM places particular emphasis on the traffic control plan. Planning considerations include-

- The selection and establishment of traffic regulating lines to include the number and location of TCPs.

- The selection and location of holding and staging areas to include TCP requirements.
- The coordination and enforcement of movement priorities.
- Ž Communication requirements, both wire and radio.
- Provisions for EPW collection and evacuation.
- Ž Provisions for refugee diversion or removal.
- Requirements for corps MP support.

*See FM 19-4 for a detailed discussion of how MP support river crossings.*

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APPENDIX A

MILITARY POLICE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT CHART

MILITARY POLICE PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT																																				
TOE NUMBER	TITLE OF TOE	PERSONNEL				WEAPONS								MOBILITY						COMMUNICATIONS						MISC										
		29	2	64	95	41	75	2	2	1				4		2	17			2	3		6	10			1	2		1	24	3	8	2		
19172L000	HHC MP BDE	29	2	64	95	41	75	2	2	1				4		2	17			2	3		6	10			1	2		1	24	3	8	2		
19176L000	HHD MP BN	14	2	52	68	22	63	2	2	1				4	1	6	15			6	3	1	4	5			1	2		1	15	4	23	3		
19177L000	MP CO, COMBAT SPT	5		171	176	147	175	44	44	1	4			4		3	2		44	1	17	1	5	41			1	17			70	7	93	45		8
19197L000	MP HEAVY SCTY CO	5		207	212	34	211	48	54	1	4	16		4		6		1	53	2	21	3	2	32		20		1			77	6	113	54		20
19198L000	MP SECURITY CO	5		148	153	135	152	41	29	1	4			4		3	7		29	2	7	1	6	24			16			52	5	62	29		8	
19223L000	MP CO, MOTORIZED DIV	6		85	91	80	66	24	29	1				4	1	1	2		26	2	7		10	22			15	1		57	10	64	29	24	7	
19313L000	MP CO, ABN DIV	7		91	98	86	66	29	29	1						2	3		29	2	2		8	24			13	1		53	7	63	30			
19323L000	MP CO, LT INF DIV	6		71	77	66	74	22	22	1					2		2		23	1	2		7	18			10	1		42	6	48	23	22	8	
19333L000	MP CO, HEAVY DIV	9		144	153	134	150	36	44	1				4	1	2	3		43	2	21		10	36			20	1		78	16	91	43		12	
19343L000	MP CO, AIR ASLT DIV	7		91	98	86	66	29	29	1						2	2		30	1	2		8	24			13	1		53	7	63	28	29	10	
19641L000	MP EPW CMD	42	2	90	134	51	80									2	11				1	2														
19643L000	MP PWIC	6		54	60	16	58									6					2							1								
19646L100	MP BN (EPW/CI)	10	2	74	86	29	72		1	1		3	1	1		7	8				4	2		2				2	4							
19646L200	MP BN (EPW/CI)	10	2	96	108	43	93		1	1		4	1	1		9	9				5	3		2				4	4							
19646L300	MP BN (EPW/CI)	10	2	112	124	57	113		1	1		5	1	1		11	10				6	4		2				6	4							
19646L400	MP BN (EPW/CI)	10	2	138	150	72	134		1	1		6	1	1		13	11				7	5		2				8	4							
19647L000	MP ESCORT GD CO	4		137	141	135	143	12	5	1	3			4		2	4		12	1			1	3		12						3		18	17	
19656L000	MP BN (CONFINEMENT)	16		120	136	65	120		2	1	3			4		8	9				3	4		4	3									2		
19667L000	MP GD CO	4		121	125	111	124	9	12	1	3	18		3		2	14				1	1	1		4		9		1		13	1	17	12		6
19762L000	MP EPW BRIGADE	31	1	56	88	25	70		2							2	12				1	2	1		4	2								1		

OFFICER  
WARRANT OFFICER  
ENLISTED  
TOTAL  
PISTOL, 45-CAL  
M18A1 RIFLE  
M203 GRENADE LAUNCHER  
M60 MACHINE GUN  
M33 RIOT CONTROL DISPENSER  
SHOTGUN, 12-GAGE  
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M190 LAUNCHER, ROCKET, PRACTICE  
TRUCK, 6-TON  
TRUCK, 2-1/2-TON  
CUCV  
HMMWV (TROOP)  
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RADIO, AN/PRC-77  
RADIO, AN/GRC-122  
TSEC/KY SPEECH-142  
SECURABLE REMOTE CONTROL  
PVS-5 NIGHT VISION EQUIP  
TVS-5 NIGHT VISION GOGGLES  
PVS-4 NIGHT VISION SIGHT  
PLATOON EARLY WARNING SYSTEM



APPENDIX B

**Metric Conversion Table**

UNIT	ABBREVIATION	NUMBER OF METERS	US EQUIVALENT
Kilometer	km	1,000	0.62 miles or 1,093.6 yards
Meter	m		3,280.8 feet 1.09 yards
Centimeter	cm	0.01	3.28 feet or 39.37 inches
Millimeter	mm	0.001	.39 inches 0.04 inches

## GLOSSARY

### ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ABGD</b> - air base ground defense	<b>CI</b> - civilian internee
<b>abn</b> - airborne	<b>cm</b> - centimeter
<b>ACofS</b> - Assistant Chief of Staff	<b>cmbt</b> - combat
<b>ADC</b> - area damage control	<b>cmd</b> - command
<b>admin</b> - administration	<b>cnfmt</b> - confinement
<b>AFOSI</b> - Air Force Office of Special Investigations	<b>co</b> - company
<b>AIM</b> - armored-infantry-mechanized	<b>coll</b> - collecting
<b>ammo</b> - ammunition	<b>comm</b> - communication
<b>AO</b> - area of operations	<b>COMMZ</b> - communications zone
<b>ASG</b> - area support group	<b>con</b> - control
<b>ASP</b> - ammunition supply point	<b>CONUS</b> - continental United States
<b>aslt</b> - assault	<b>coord</b> - coordination
<b>ASPS</b> - all source production section	<b>COSCOM</b> - corps support command
<b>ATGL</b> - antitank grenade launcher	<b>CP</b> - command post
<b>ATGM</b> - antitank guided missile	<b>CS</b> - combat support
<b>auth</b> - authority	<b>CSA</b> - <b>corps</b> storage area
	<b>CSE</b> - <b>corps</b> support element
<b>BCC</b> - battlefield circulation control	<b>CSG</b> - corps support group
<b>bde</b> - brigade	<b>CSS</b> - combat service support
<b>bn</b> - battalion	<b>ctr</b> - center
<b>br</b> - branch	<b>CUCV</b> - commercial utility cargo vehicle
<b>BSA</b> - brigade support area	
	<b>DA</b> - Department of the Army
<b>CA</b> - civil affairs	<b>depn</b> - dependent
<b>Cal</b> - caliber	<b>det</b> - detachment
<b>CASE</b> - corps area support element	<b>displny</b> - disciplinary
<b>CG</b> - commanding general	<b>div</b> - division
<b>ch</b> - chaplain	<b>DOD</b> - Department of Defense

**DS** - direct support

**DSA** - division support area

**DSE** - division support elements

**DZ** - drop zone

**EAC** - echelons above corps

**elm** - element

**EO** - equal opportunity

**EPW** - enemy prisoner of war

**equip** - equipment

**ESCRG** - escort guard

**FA** - field artillery

**FC** - field circular

**FEBA** - forward edge of the battle area

**FID** - foreign internal defense

**FM** - field manual

**FSL** - field storage location

**G1** - Assistant Chief of Staff, G1 (Personnel)

**G2** - Assistant Chief of Staff, G2 (Intelligence)

**G3** - Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 (Operations and Plans)

**G4** - Assistant Chief of Staff, G4 (Logistics)

**G6** - Assistant Chief of Staff, G5 (Civil Affairs)

**gd** - guard

**gp** - group

**GL** - grenade launcher

**GS** - general support

**HHC** - headquarters and headquarters company

**HHD** - headquarters and headquarters detachment

**HMMWV** - high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle

**HN** - host nation

**HNS** - host nation support

**HTF** - how to fight

**HTH** - highway traffic headquarters

**HTMD** - high technology motorized division

**HQ** - headquarters

**IAW** - in accordance with

**inf** - infantry

**int** - intelligence

**IPB** - intelligence preparation of the battlefield

**JAG** - Judge Advocate General

**km** - kilometer

**LIC** - low-intensity conflict

**LOC** - lines of communication

**LOGSEC** - logistics security

**LP** - listening post

**lt** - light

**LZ** - landing zone

**m** - meter

**maint** - maintenance

**MBA** - main battle area

**med** - medical  
**METT-T** - mission, enemy, terrain, troops,  
and time available  
**MG** - machine gun  
**mil** - military  
**mm** - millimeter  
**MP** - military police  
**MPLRP** - military police long-range plans  
**MR** - motorized rifle  
**MRL** - multiple rocket launcher  
**MSR** - main supply route  
**MWD** - military working dog  
  
**NASP** - nuclear ammunition supply point  
**NATO** - North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
**NBC** - nuclear, biological, chemical  
**NCO** - noncommissioned officer  
**NCS** - net control station  
**no** - number  
  
**off** - officer  
**OMG** - operational maneuver group  
**OP** - observation post  
**OPCON** - operational control  
**opn** - operation  
  
**PASE** - port area support element  
**PCO** - peacetime contingency operation  
**pers** - personnel  
**PERSCOM** - personnel command  
**pet** - petroleum

**PEWS** - platoon early warning system  
**PK** - peacekeeping  
**plt** - platoon  
**PM** - provost marshal  
**PRC** - populace and resources control  
**pris** - prisoner  
**proc** - processing  
**proj** - project  
**PW** - prisoner of war  
**PWIC** - prisoner of war/civilian internee  
information center  
  
**QSTAG** - quadripartite standardization  
agreement  
  
**RAOC** - rear area operations center  
**rec** - record  
**reg** - region  
**rep** - repair  
**RR** - race relations  
  
**S1** - Adjutant (US Army)  
**S2** - Intelligence Officer (US Army)  
**S3** - Operations and Training Officer (US  
Army)  
**S4** - Supply Officer (US Army)  
**S5** - Civil Affairs Officer (US Army)  
**SAM** - surface-to-air missile  
**Scty** - security  
**sec** - section  
**SJA** - staff judge advocate  
**SP** - self-propelled

**spt** - support  
**STANAG** - standardization agreement  
**sqd** - squad  
**Surg** - surgeon  
**sup** - supply  
**Svc** - service

**TA** - theater army  
**TAC** - Tactical Air Command  
**TACCS** - tactical army combat service  
support computer system  
**TAACOM** - theater army area command  
**TAMCA** - Theater Army Movement  
Control Agency  
**TASE** - theater area support element  
**TCF** - tactical combat force

**TCP** - traffic control post  
**tm** - team  
**TOE** - table(s) of organization and  
equipment  
**TRANSCOM** - transportation command  
**trt** - treatment  
**TSE** - theater support element  
  
**UN** - United Nations  
**US** - United States  
**USACIDC** - United States Army Criminal  
Investigation Command  
**util** - utility  
**w/** - with  
**WHA** - weapons holding area  
**wo** - without

## REFERENCES

### REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS

Required publications are sources which users must read in order to understand or to comply with FM 19-1.

#### FIELD MANUALS

<b>19-4</b>	<b>Military Police Team, Squad, Platoon Combat Operations</b>
<b>19-10</b>	<b>Military Police Law and Order Operations</b>
<b>101-6-1</b>	<b>Operational Terms and Symbols</b>

### RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Related publications are sources of additional information. Users do not have to read them to understand FM 19-1.

#### DA FORM

<b>2028</b>	<b>Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms</b>
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#### FIELD MANUALS

<b>5-20</b>	<b>Camouflage</b>
<b>6-34</b>	<b>Engineer Field Data</b>
<b>5-36</b>	<b>Route Reconnaissance and Classification</b>
<b>5-104</b>	<b>General Engineering</b>
<b>9-6</b>	<b>Ammunition Service in the Theater of Operations</b>
<b>9-64</b>	<b>Special Ammunition (Nuclear) Direct and General Support Unit Operations</b>
<b>10-13</b>	<b>Supply and Service Reference Data</b>
<b>10-67</b>	<b>Petroleum Supply in Theaters of Operations</b>
<b>11-50</b>	<b>Combat Communications Within the Division (How to Fight)</b>
<b>11-92(HTF)</b>	<b>Combat Communications Within the Corps (How to Fight)</b>
<b>12-3-4</b>	<b>Echelons Above Corps (EAC) Personnel and Administrative Doctrine</b>
<b>17-95</b>	<b>Cavalry Operations</b>
<b>19-15</b>	<b>Civil Disturbances</b>
<b>19-40</b>	<b>Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees and Detained Persons</b>
<b>24-1</b>	<b>Combat Communications</b>
<b>34-1</b>	<b>Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations</b>
<b>34-3</b>	<b>Intelligence Analysis</b>
<b>41-10</b>	<b>Civil Affairs Operations</b>

**54-40** Area Support Group  
**55-1** Army Transportation Services in a Theater of Operations  
**55-10** Movement Control in a Theater of Operations  
**63-1** Combat Service Support Operations, Separate Brigade  
**63-2** Combat Service Support Operations - Division (How to Support)  
**63-3** Combat Service Support Operations - Corps (How to Support)  
**63-3J** Combat Service Support Operations - Corps  
**63-4** Combat Service Support Operations - Theater Army Area Command  
**71-3(HTF)** Armored and Mechanized Brigade Operations (How to Fight)  
**71-100(HTF)** Armored and Mechanized Division Operations (How to Fight)  
**71-101(HTF)** Infantry, Airborne, and Air Assault Division Operations  
**90-3(HTF)** Desert Operations (How to Fight)  
**90-4** Air Assault Operations  
**90-5(HTF)** Jungle Operations (How to Fight)  
**90-6** Mountain Operations  
**90-8** Counter guerrilla Operations  
**90-10(HTF)** Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (How to Fight)  
**90-13(HTF)** River Crossing Operations (How to Fight)  
**90-14** Rear Battle  
**100-1** The Army  
**100-2-1** Soviet Army Operations and Tactics  
**100-5** Operations  
**100-10** Combat Service Support (How to Support)  
**100-15(TEST)** Larger Unit Operations  
**100-16** Support Operations: Echelons Above Corps  
**100-20** Low Intensity Conflict  
**100-37** Terrorism Counteraction  
**101-5** Staff Organization and Operations  
**700-80** Logistics

**NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS/  
 QUADRIPARTITE STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENTS\***

**1059** National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces

**2010/504**      **Military Load Classification Markings**  
**2014/506**      **Operation Orders, Warning Orders and**  
                   **Administrative/Logistics Orders**  
**2019/509**      **Military Symbols for Land Base Systems**  
**2024**            **Military Vehicle Lighting**  
**2025/591**      **Basic Military Road Traffic Regulations**  
**2041/520**      **Operation Orders, Tables and Graphs for Road**  
                   **Movement**  
**2044/523**      **Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War**  
                   **(PW)**  
**2047**            **Emergency Alarms of Hazards or Attack (NBC and**  
                   **Air Attack Only)**  
**2067/526**      **Control and Return of Stragglers**  
**2074/526**      **Training in Combat Survival**  
**2079/527**      **Rear Area Security and Rear Area Damage**  
                   **Control**  
**2084/528**      **Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy**  
                   **Equipment and Documents**  
**2091**            **Population Movement Control**  
**2101/533**      **Establishing Liaison**  
**2103/187**      **Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Biological and**  
                   **Chemical Attacks, and Predicting and**  
                   **Warning of Associated Hazards and Hazard**  
                   **Areas**  
**2104/189**      **Friendly Nuclear Strike Warning**  
**2154/539**      **Regulations for Military Motor Vehicle Movement**  
                   **by Road**  
**2159/640**      **Identification of Movement Control and Traffic**  
                   **Control Personnel and Agencies**  
**2174/507**      **Military Routes and Route/Road Networks**  
**2263/174**      **Roads and Road Structures**  
**2889**            **Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes Through**  
                   **Them**  
**3632**            **Transport of Troops by Helicopter**

**TRAINING CIRCULAR**

**19-16**            **Countering Terrorism on US Army Installations**

**COMMAND PUBLICATIONS**

Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels. Determine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire three years from the date of publication, unless sooner rescinded.



**FC 100-20      Low-Intensity Conflict. July 1986. Commandant,  
US Army Command and General Staff  
College, ATTN: ATZL-SWJ-CL Ft Leaven-  
worth, KS 66027-6900**

\* STANAGs/QSTAGs are available, upon request, from Naval Publications and Forms Center,  
5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120.

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